Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

Spring 6-9-2014

Participation in Technology Standards Development:
A Decision Model for the Information and
Communications Technology Industry
Ramin Neshati
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Technology and Innovation Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Neshati, Ramin, "Participation in Technology Standards Development: A Decision Model for the
Information and Communications Technology Industry" (2014). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1850.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1849

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Participation in Technology Standards Development:
A Decision Model for the Information and Communications Technology Industry

by
Ramin Neshati

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Technology Management

Dissertation Committee:
Tugrul U. Daim, Chair
Timothy R. Anderson
Scott A. Schaffer
Robert R. Harmon

Portland State University
2014

© 2014 Ramin Neshati

Abstract
There is a dearth of decision-support models or frameworks to aid managers in
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry in uniformly assessing
the key factors in the decision to standardize innovative technologies. Making the
proper decision is consequential and potentially fraught with risks for the firm such as
competitive exposure, high expenditures with inadequate returns, restrictive inbound or
outbound patent licensing obligations, and related complications.
This study presents a framework to guide managers in the ICT industry in
assessing the factors that inform the decision to participate in the development of
technology standards. Using multi-criteria decision analysis and judgment data from
panels of experts, a robust model is developed that comprehends the essential criteria
and outcomes within the context of computer interconnect technologies. The resultant,
generalizable model is validated against the case of the extant Universal Serial Bus (USB)
interconnect standard and found to be congruent with the assessment of the experts.
Scholarship on technology standards development is rich and multifaceted—
spanning numerous streams of inquiry. This research contextualizes technology
standardization within the economic, strategic, organizational, and legal perspectives.
The resultant model demonstrates that strategic planning is regarded by the experts as
the principal driver in the decision to participate in a technology standardization effort.
Furthermore, the primacy of commitment and leadership within the standards-setting
i

organization is unambiguously established through rigorous quantitative analysis. The
proposed model verifies that the firm’s desire to align its product roadmap to the
emerging standard is the chief criterion in the decision to contribute to the standards
development effort. Other criteria of high interest include the leveraging of network
externalities to glean disruptive trends within the ecosystem, the exploration of
opportunities to expand the total available market for the firm, and the availability and
terms of IP licenses. Sensitivity analysis affirms the overall predictive strength and
robustness of the model and its widespread applicability.
Future research on model expansion and application to other technologies, as
well as the development of uniform patent valuation methods will further enrich the
knowledge base.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Innovative technologies produced by the ICT industry permeate all facets of
modern human existence spanning education, scientific exploration, commerce, finance,
law, medicine, sports, entertainment, social networks, and so on. The products that
embody these technologies rest at the core of a vast array of devices and functions such
as personal computers, cellular phones, communication networks, game consoles,
digital media players, high-performance computers that form the backbone of the
Internet, “cloud” services, controllers in modern automobiles and airplanes, missioncritical systems, industrial, medical and life-support equipment, point-of-sale registers
and scanners in retail stores, electronic billboards and so on.
ICT firms such as Apple, Cisco, Google, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle,
Qualcomm, Samsung and others hold dominant positions in this industry—an industry
that has been characterized by some scholars as “winner-take-all.”1 Ironically, in this
dynamic, high-velocity industry no technology firm is “an island, entire of itself.” This is
especially true of firms whose products depend on technology standards.
A standard represents consensus among different agents operating within
mutually acceptable practices. Thus, a technology standard can be rendered as an
arrangement that enforces conformance of all elements of products, processes,
formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction.2
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Technology standardization reduces product incompatibility, increases
interoperability, and accelerates broad diffusion and adoption of innovations in the ICT
industry. A technology-intensive product such as a smartphone or a personal computer
is built with many protected intellectual assets such as patents that are held by any
number of ICT firms. While some firms may own impressive portfolios of intellectual
assets, no one firm owns all of the patents involved in building a smartphone, a personal
computer, or other complex devices.
The ideas and methods described by patents find their way into technology
standards which are eventually adopted in a variety of products. However, as the
complexities of technology markets and the uniform adoption of standards are too
daunting for any ICT firm to influence or direct on its own, many firms are faced with IPrelated uncertainties.3
To develop leading-edge, interoperable products ICT firms enter into standards
coalitions to gain access to a broader array of intellectual assets, to interact with ready
ecosystems of partners and complementors and to gain a voice in influencing the pace
and direction of technology standards development. While beneficial, participation in
SDOs can be fraught with risks that are poorly understood and seldom mitigated by
these firms. How do ICT firms decide whether or not to join a standards development
effort? This and related questions are explored and addressed in this treatise.
This study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the topic, provides a
taxonomy and definition of terms, identifies the problems and explains the motivations
-2-

for the research. Chapter 2 gives a broad survey of the academic literature, including
various streams of direct and related inquiry. Chapter 3 outlines the gaps in the
literature as well as the research questions that address these gaps. Chapter 4 explains
the research methodology. Chapter 5 defines the decision model and the various levels
of its hierarchy. Chapter 6 describes the design and framework of research, data
collection, and cases analysis. Chapter 7 outlines the results and the sensitivity analysis
performed on them. Chapter 8 furnishes a discussion of the findings as well as their
import and implications. Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions derived from the
research, enumerates the limitations encountered during the research, and concludes
with an agenda for future scholarly endeavors. References appear at the end of the
document.

1.1

Overview of Technology Standardization
Without standardization there wouldn’t be a modern economy!4 This bold

assertion is not entirely hyperbolic. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of technological
innovation occurs within the multi-invention context of standards, without which we
could not uniformly use a wall outlet to power our electrical gadgets, fit the nozzle at
any filling station into our automobile fuel tank, seamlessly and uninterruptedly use the
services of transnational railways, swipe our debit or credit card at any retail store, use
our computer to connect to the Internet for the electronic exchange of personal or
commercial information and so on.
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Likewise, users of technology-intensive products share and exchange
information through compatible documents, databases and related interoperable tools
provided by different vendors, all of which are built on foundations laid by technology
standards. The QWERTY keyboard is a ubiquitous example of a timely and useful
technology standard.5
The standardization of technological innovations is deemed sufficiently crucial to
prompt government authorities in nearly all developed and emerging economies into
taking an active interest in the establishment and guidance of national and international
standards-setting organizations, and in evolving laws to institutionalize their charters,
policies and practices.6 One need not look farther than the Internet to be convinced of
the crucial importance of technology standards as building blocks for a wide range of
commercial and non-commercial applications.7
Thus, it is clear that standards are sine qua non in all facets of consumer and
corporate life. Many benefits accrue to the producer and to the consumer of standardsbased technology products. For the producer, standards enable the broad adoption of
its products and hasten additional innovations through coordination with a network of
collaborators that supply complementary products and services. For the consumer,
standards foster early access to innovations and provide a tacit promise of
interoperability among products and services from a heterogeneous mix of vendors.
Technology standards development can be a strategic activity for many firms in
the ICT industry since it promotes distributed innovation and inter-firm collaboration.
-4-

Adherence to technology standards is critical for building modular and interoperable
products. It allows firms to concentrate on innovations that add incremental or unique
value. To wit, keystone firms rely on standards as a means to reduce investments
through distributed innovation while concomitantly preserving their technology
leadership. Standards spawn complementary innovations that enhance the value of
interoperable products emanating from a horizontally disintegrated ecosystem. 8
Firms that lead in the development of technology standards are ahead of the
pack on the path to dominant market positions; indeed in some cases they become the
standard.9 Consider, for instance, that in 2009 Microsoft held sway over 94 percent of
the global desktop operating system market, Intel had roughly 83 percent market
segment share in PC microprocessors and Apple dominated more than 82 percent of the
portable music market. However, the perceived best technology does not always gain
prominence or become a de facto standard. The ICT industry is witness to many failures,
including the IBM PS/2 operating system and the Apple Newton personal digital
assistant.
Technology standards eliminate incompatibility between similar products from
different vendors, and thereby enhance the overall value of the offering by enabling the
incremental supplementation of features and functions to basic “vanilla” products. 10
This value is a consequence of the network effects engendered through the process of
technology standards development by firms that provide complementary products and
services that conform to these technology standards.11
-5-

Standardization plays a crucial role in the broad diffusion of technological
innovations. Arguably, standards accelerate technology adoption by enabling “the
timely deployment of value-added functionality, followed by the broadest possible
industry support for the necessary infrastructure to deliver the next level of
innovations.”12
If a technology can be instantiated in multiple different ways with dissimilar
interface points, there is the potential for proliferation of incongruent methods for
accomplishing the same task or end result. Such proliferations in turn can lead to
inefficiencies and lower returns for the firm or to confusion and higher costs for the
consumer, or to both. Thus, technology standards are essential for the coherence of
research investments as well as the compatibility and interplay of heterogeneous
offerings from multiple product integrators worldwide.13
Technology standards are infused with the intellectual assets and the protected
innovations of firms that may or may not participate in the definition and diffusion of
such standards. Every technology-intensive product contains a multitude of standardsbased technologies that are covered by some form of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
regime.14
The rents accrued from the licensing of IP constitute sizeable revenue streams
for many firms in the ICT industry. For example, IBM has historically earned a sizeable
portion of its total annual revenues from royalties derived from the licensing of its large
and diverse IP portfolio.15 16 In 2009, it was estimated that IBM earned well over $3-4
-6-

billion in licensing revenues from its IP portfolio, and that sum is on the rise.17
Qualcomm has a similarly lucrative revenue stream from the licensing of its IP portfolio.
In 2011 it racked up over $6 billion in IP royalties.18 19 This sum is noteworthy since in
2007 IP-related earnings accounted for only a third of Qualcomm revenues. Other ICT
firms are replicating this recipe for revenue growth and strategic advantage. Table 1
depicts the top 5 ICT firms being awarded patents in the United States in 2011:20
Table 1 - Top 5 ICT firms awarded U.S. patents in 2011.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Firm
IBM
Samsung
Canon
Sony
Panasonic

Number of Patents Awarded
6,478
5,081
3,174
3,032
2,769

-7-

1.2

The Nature and Scope of the Problem
Technology firms invest in Research and Development (R&D) which invariably

results in the creation of IP that is safeguarded by the firm and protected by regional,
national and international law. Much of this IP consistently finds its way into technology
standards as a result of inter-firm collaboration and contribution during the process of
standards definition and development.
The complex phenomenon of the integration of IP from various sources into
innovative products via multiple technology standards is depicted in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1 - Propagation of IP in technology products through standards.
To ensure fair and equal access to the essential IP required for building
compliant and interoperable products, organizations that develop technology standards
manage and administer Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) as part of their charter as
outlined in bylaws or similar legal instruments. All members of these organizations are
bound by the same rules and policies.
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The privileges and obligations that IPR policies bestow on the licensor and the
licensee, respectively, vary in clarity of scope and linguistic precision, and are usually
non-uniform across different organizations, national laws or international agreements.21
In the ICT industry a firm’s position in the innovation chain, whether upstream to
IP innovation or downstream to it, is a major factor in determining licensing and royalty
policies.22 Another concern is the size of the firm, where small and medium entities
(SMEs) have a more intense need to protect their intellectual assets in order to ensure
their long-term survival.23
The accelerated pace of innovation in the ICT industry, the increasing complexity
of semiconductor and software technologies, the changing shape of markets, the
fluctuating positions and ranks of various firms and other market uncertainties,
combinationally can hinder innovation through standardization.24
Standards setting organizations usually operate without regard to the
imperatives that drive business priorities. Thus the friction inherent in the co-evolution
of standards organizations and IPR policies in the ICT industry is real and unchecked. In
particular, tensions can escalate when the instantiation of a standard calls for the
integration of protected IP whose holder will either not grant a license or may require
exorbitant rents. Such outcomes can result in revisions to the standard to remove the IP,
which concomitantly elevates risk, uncertainty and inefficiency.

-9-

1.3

Terminology and Taxonomy
Familiarization with commonly used technical terms and their descriptions may

prove instructive before delving deeper into the subject at hand. There are many
definitions for what constitutes a technology standard as outlined below:
a) “A specification or a design with a dominant market position in the industry for its
product class.”25
b) “A common language that promotes the flow of goods between buyer and seller …”
and the process of standardization is the pursuit of conformity of all elements of
products, processes, formats, or procedures that make up an industry standard, with
the objective of increasing the efficiency of economic activity within a generally
defined industry or narrowly defined sub-sector of an industry.26
c) “A technological format that has been agreed to by either one firm or a set of firms,
that has come into existence, may be promoted as a basis for reference and use
outside the firm(s), and/or at least one or more of the relevant potential users have
adopted the format.”27
d) “A formulation established verbally, in writing or by any other graphical method, or
by means of a model, sample or other physical means of representation, to serve
during a certain period of time for defining, designing or specifying certain features
of a unit or basis of measurement, a physical object, an action, a process, a method,
a practice, a capacity, a function, a duty, a right, a responsibility, a behavior, an
attitude, a concept or a conception, or a combination of any of these, with the
- 10 -

object of promoting economy and efficiency in production, disposal, regulation
and/or utilization of goods and services, by providing a common ground of
understanding among producers, dealers, consumers, users, technologists and other
groups concerned.”28
Furthermore, technology standards can be classified into three kinds: reference,
minimum quality, and interface.
Reference and minimum quality standards indicate that a product conforms to
the content and level of certain defined characteristics, whereas interface standards
provide the requisite aplomb that an intermediate product can be successfully
incorporated into a larger system given specified inputs and outputs.29
The establishment of technology standards comes about either through
unsponsored activities where no identified originator holds a proprietary interest, or
sponsored activities where one or more entities hold a direct interest, or agreements
facilitated through organizations, or governmental mandates.
Unsponsored and sponsored activities emerge through market-mediated
processes and are generally referred to as de facto standards, whereas agreements and
governmental mandates emerge through political deliberations or administrative
procedures and are generally referred to as de jure standards. This classification is
shown in Table 2 below:
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Table 2 - The typology of SDOs (David, 1987).
Type

Output
Unsponsored standard

de facto
Sponsored standard
Contracted standard
de jure
Mandated standard

Explanation
Specifications with no identified originator holding a
proprietary interest
Specifications with one or more identified originators holding
proprietary interest
Specifications developed and published by a voluntary
standards developing organization
Specifications promulgated by governmental agencies with
regulatory authority

Throughout this study, therefore, a de facto standard will refer to that which is
developed by loosely formed consortia of technology firms with a vested interest in its
adoption and diffusion, while a de jure standard will refer to that which is developed by
a formal consortium or authority-wielding agency of a national government or an
internationally recognized association. The extent of this study embraces de facto
technology standards that are defined and promulgated in the ICT industry as this is an
acutely under-researched area.
The American Society for Testing and Materials, now ASTM International,
identifies four types of standards as shown in Table 3 below:30
Table 3 - Types of standards (ASTM International, 2005).
Standard
Company
Consortium
Industry

Government

Description
Consensus among employees of an
organization (i.e. a business firm)
Consensus among a small group of likeminded firms
Consensus among a large group of firms
within an association of firms or an
industry
Consensus enforced by government
mandate or policy

- 12 -

Participants
Some or all employees of the company
Some or all participating members of the
consortium
Some or all participating members of the
industry
Some or all entities with business
interest within the jurisdiction of the
government

1.4

Intellectual Assets
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) defines Intellectual

Property (IP) as “creations of the mind - creative works or ideas embodied in a form that
can be shared or can enable others to recreate, emulate, or manufacture them.”31
Patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets are distinct ways that firms or
individuals may protect their intellectual assets.
Patents describe novel and non-obvious inventions and gives its owner exclusive
rights to exploit that invention. Copyrights protect creative expressions such as books,
music, software programs and other such creations. Trademarks provide unique and
differentiable identity to a brand, logo or other such constructions. Trade secrets, unlike
the other forms of intellectual assets, are kept confidential and are not disclosed. They
are the unique methods, designs, formulations, and other such inventions that the firm
considers to be too important to be made public.32
A patent grants the inventor exclusive rights for a limited period of time in
exchange for public disclosure of the invention. Patents are of various types such as
Design, Dress, Plant, Utility and others. The design of an automotive engine is a good
example of a component that is protected under multiple patents. A Plant patent covers
distinct, sexually produced plants with a variety of cultivation techniques, new seedlings
or other original advances. A Dress patent covers the visible look, feel, appearance or
packaging of a product, while a Utility patent covers a new machine, process

- 13 -

manufacture or composition of matter. The bulk of the patents in the ICT industry are of
the Utility type and thus they form the locus of this study.
A copyright grants exclusive right to the holder to copy or distribute the
protected material for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure. Books,
movies, technology specifications and software are typical examples of copyrighted IP.
A trademark is a unique name, logo or image used to distinguish the source of
the product offering and to promote brand identity. The Apple “bitten” logo, the Nike
“swoosh” logo and the NBC tri-note chime are examples of well-known trademarks.
A trade secret is classified information held by a firm or legal entity and is used in
the creation of product offerings. Given its confidential nature, a trade secret is not
publicly disclosed. The design of circuits in microprocessor chips or the formulae used in
soft drinks, such as Coca Cola, are typical examples of trade secrets. Sans trade secrets,
these intellectual assets are summarized in Table 4:33
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Table 4 - Summary of intellectual assets (Metzger, 1992).
Feature
Scope of
protection

Patent
Novel, non-obvious and
useful inventions

Copyright
Wide range of creative
works that are fixed and
original

Registration
requirement

Yes

Copyright exists absent
registration; registration
necessary for infringement
suit

Duration

17 years from issuance
or 20 years from filing
By assignment or license
Making, using or selling
patented invention or its
substantial equivalent

Life of author plus 70 years

Transferability
Infringement

By assignment or license
Violation of owner’s
exclusive right to produce,
prepare derivative works,
distribute copies, perform
or display; fair use defense
available

Trademark
Trademarks, service marks,
certification marks, and
collective marks of
sufficient distinctiveness
Unregistered marks
protected under section
43(a); registration
necessary for infringement
suit under section 32(1)
10 years, with possible 10year renewals
Limited
Use of mark in connection
with advertisement or sale
that is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or
deception regarding origin

Patents, the focus of this study, were originally established by the medieval
Venetian state in 1474 which defined the basic features of the law still in practice today.
The intent behind the law was to spur innovation through the incentive of limited-time
exclusivity. In 1787 the United States Constitutional Convention recommended that
Congress be given the power to promote the progress of sciences and useful arts by
securing to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive right to his inventions. This
recommendation was unanimously adopted and incorporated into the final draft of the
United States Constitution.34 The importance of the patenting system as a source of
economic return for innovative firms has been documented in the scholarly literature. 35
Two distinct views are germane when considering a portfolio of intellectual
assets such as patents. The portfolio can be viewed as a defense or shield-like
mechanism and used primarily for protection by the firm against competition through
- 15 -

cross-licensing arrangements as a hedge against potential patent assertion or
infringement suit. This allows the firm to maintain focus on its core business of
generating value through commercialization of innovations. On the other hand, the
portfolio can be viewed as an offensive or sword-like mechanism and used primarily as a
revenue-generating asset by the firm. In this way, firms can assert their rights and derive
revenue through licensing rents and royalties, entering into joint ventures and other
strategic ventures. This allows the firm to harvest value from the exploitation of its
intellectual assets.36 This IP portfolio strategy is depicted in Table 5:
Table 5 - IP portfolio strategy.
Consideration
Strategy
Usage
Application
Benefit

Portfolio-as-Protection
Defensive (used as a “shield”)
The firm can protect itself from
competitive attack
Protection from patent infringement
suits through cross-licensing
Allows the firm to focus on core
business and to commercialize its
innovations

Portfolio-as-Asset
Offensive (used as a “sword”)
The firm can derive value or position
itself for joint ventures
Source of revenue through licensing
rents, joint ventures, etc.
Allows the firm to harvest value from
the exploitation of its intellectual
assets

The adoption of technology standards entails the process of design,
implementation and seamless inter-operation of heterogeneous products from a variety
of firms. The computing industry, comprehending IT goods and services such as personal
computers, operating systems, databases, and so on, and the communications industry,
comprehending telecommunications goods and services such smartphones, data or
media services, and so on, have historically operated with different assumptions and
requirements with regard to IP contributions in technology standards. It requires no
further elaboration that these two industries have recently blended together, leaving
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open a number of vexing questions about the cross-dependent and dissonant strategies
of many firms that operate across multiple industrial boundaries.

1.5

Standards Developing Organizations
An SDO, sometimes referred to as Standards Setting Organization (SSO),

operates under the aegis and sponsorship of a consortium of like-minded firms or a
national organization, and may draw its membership through representation from a
variety of firms, institutions or individuals with an interest in the field. Examples of SDOs
include IEEE, ANSI and ECMA. An International Standards Developing Organization
(ISDO) operates at the multi-national level with representation determined by a national
organization, governmental bureau or imprimatur, and generally carries a high level of
legitimacy and influence. Examples of ISDOs include ISO and ITU. SDOs and ISDOs
generally issue de jure technology standards.37
A Special Interest Group (SIG) is a special-purpose, legally constituted
consortium of firms to advance the collaborative development of narrowly-focused
technology specifications. By construct, a SIG is an informal and decentralized standards
developing association. As an incorporated, legally recognized entity, a SIG may operate
as a mutual-benefit, non-profit corporation with bylaws, a governing board, elected
officers and so on, similar to most SDOs.38 In the United States, for instance, a taxexempt SIG is legally recognized under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.39
Examples of SIGs include Bluetooth and USB. SIGs generally issue de facto standards.40
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On the origin of technology standards consortia in the ICT industry, Hawkins
(1999) maintains that the first such consortium was formed in Europe in 1963 called the
European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA).41 ECMA defined much of the
organizational practices of SDOs in use today and was held in high regard by
international organizations such as the ISO and the ITU. These practices include
membership rules, IPR policies, committee processes, finances, specification
development procedures, and so on.
It took changes in US laws starting in 1988, specifically the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act and the 1993 National Cooperative Research and Production Act,
that encouraged closer collaboration among American technology firms to develop
standards within the structure of SDOs. Figure 3 below depicts the SDO taxonomy
discussed herein:

Figure 2 - SDO taxonomy.
Technology standards mitigate technical uncertainty, lower transaction costs,
increase the efficiency of information sharing among participants, reduce trial and error
in design and improve overall productivity.42
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The collective learning infused through network externalities and ecosystems
reduce “nonstrategic sources of variety in design” by providing focus and clarity in a sea
of technological options.43 However, the convergence of the computing and
communications industries and the incongruency of the prevalent IPR policies governing
the standards organizations in each of these market segments, together with the growth
of IP-related problems such as undeclared essential IP in standards, vague ex post
licensing terms and royalty expectations, “troll” or “non-practicing” firms, “holdups,”
“ambushes” and the growing number of IP-related law suits in recent years, pose
serious financial and strategic challenges to firms that wish to operate across industrial
boundaries.44
Moreover, the omnipresent potential of collusion in standards organizations, the
repercussions of antitrust law, as well as the economic impact of IP-induced injunctions
on commerce can be distracting, if not debilitating, to technology firms irrespective of
size or market power.45

1.6

Risks and Issues in Technology Standardization
As technological diffusion through standardization comes into conflict with the

assertion of IPR, innovation and leadership are jeopardized, giving rise to potentially
dire consequences for many firms. Working around IP holdups and minefields is a risky
proposition since it is not clear if the innovation that replaces it is adequate and
available. This in turn results in confusion over the marketability of the technology and
to delays in the adoption and diffusion of the standard.
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Many ICT firms view IPR as a “necessary evil” owing to the requisite investments
in building and protecting IP portfolios for defensive purposes while resorting to other
means to recoup investments in standards-based innovations.46 Many other problems
persist, including the undeclared ownership of IP within standards organizations to
prevent inadvertent infringement, IP monetization, royalty stacking, and so on.
Acknowledging these issues, the United States Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission released a joint report in 2007 aimed at the promotion of
innovation and competition by issuing clarifications over IPR antitrust enforcement.47
Also in 2007, the European Commission began to probe several questionable IP-related
practices on the parts of RAMBUS and Qualcomm after complaints were lodged against
those companies alleging breach of rules and unfair exploitations of IPR.48
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), developed by the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), with a broad scope to define
the technical specifications for digital cellular networks, brought many of these issues to
the forefront on a global scale starting in the late-1980s and into the 1990s.49
More recent examples that embody IPR infringement comprise high-profile law
suits, including the cases of the BlackBerry smartphone and the Apple iPhone. In the
case of the former, BlackBerry was found to have infringed on patents held by a small
company called NTP, among others, which was at first awarded $53 million but
BlackBerry fiercely resisted payment. Having exhausted all of its legal appeal options,
BlackBerry eventually settled for over $600 million, a nearly twelve-fold penalty!50 In the
- 20 -

case of the latter, Apple was sued by cell phone giant Nokia, again for patent
infringement. Apple fought back but eventually settled for an undisclosed amount
believed to be around 2 percent of iPhone sales plus ongoing royalties.51 Other
examples that portend of the “IP wars” phenomenon include Apple vs. Samsung, Oracle
vs. Google, Microsoft vs. Motorola and many other such entanglements.52 53 54
In the ICT industry many firms are entangled in “IP wars” over infringement and
licensing issues. For example, Apple was sued by Nokia and is in turn suing Samsung.
Apple and Google have locked horns many times over the past few years. Google
acquired the Motorola Mobility patent portfolio to buttress its IP holdings and Microsoft
followed suit with its purchase of the Nokia patent portfolio. Oracle and Google are in
litigation over various IP-related issues, and the list goes on. This litigious environment
represents a recent phenomenon in the ICT industry which has been attributed to the
increasing value of intellectual assets and the unwillingness of large IP portfolio owners
to enter into cross-licensing arrangements or to join SDOs.
With the stated uncertainties over the protected intellectual assets of innovating
firms, the incongruency of IPR regimes in the various standards organizations and the
dependence of ICT products on a growing number of technology standards, what
challenges await firms whose products contain inventions couched in numerous
technologies that span multiple standards and IPR policies?
The complexity of this problem amplifies with the requirement for product
interoperability across a broad spectrum of offerings from multiple vendors, many of
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whom are rivals and not readily cooperative. There are a number of other problems
enumerated in the following sections that span a broad spectrum from the
acknowledged to the obdurate.
Many patent-related problems are known, albeit not adequately addressed.
These problems include ambush, holdup, thicket, vague licensing terms, and so on.55
An ambush arises when the owner of essential IP knowingly contributes it, prima
facie, without asserting any rights or claiming that it will not assert rights, only to
change course and assert rights after products have implemented the essential IP. The
case of RAMBUS Incorporated illustrates this problem.56
A holdup arises when the owner of essential IP refuses to license irrespective of
rents and royalties, and thus shackles the products that depend on that IP and
ultimately impedes innovation. The case of Dell Corporation typifies this problem.57
A thicket materializes when the essential IP is embedded as part of a web of
overlapping IP which complicates isolation of the essential IP and gives rise to confusion
and the “stacking” of multiple assets from multiple sources, thereby curbing imitators
and impeding innovation. The case of Xerox Corporation exemplifies this problem.58
Collusion and antitrust issues can develop when multiple influential firms
cooperate among themselves to define the rules of standardization and IPR policies to
the exclusion of the broader ecosystem, including their closest rivals, thus giving
themselves an unfair advantage by erecting barriers to innovation and competition.
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Standards-based product development necessitates careful management and
navigation around a plethora of technological, commercial and legal risks. When
choosing a technology standard, a firm must pay close attention to economic models
that measure risk. These models take into account the number of firms active in the
initiative since firm size and the number of participating firms has an effect on the
market risk as accounted for by a change in the  value as well as the idiosyncratic risk
as represented by a change in the Mean Square Error (MSE).59 The value is a measure
of the volatility of an entity, such as a firm’s stock value, in relation to the collective,
such as an index or a market of other stocks, whereas the MSE is a measure of the
difference between an estimating function and the estimated quantity.60 In general,
firms electing to participate in large standardization efforts can expect a reduction in
market risks but an increase in idiosyncratic risks when compared to firms choosing to
participate in smaller standards group or attempting to unilaterally standardize their
own technologies and products.
At the industry level, incongruent IPR licensing terms across SDOs or those that
are ambiguous and open to interpretation engender a raft of problems that are without
precedent and thus carry indeterminate risk for ICT firms. For example, the term
“reasonable” in the Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) IPR policy is imprecise
and open to interpretation. The owner of the essential IP can demand uniform rents
that may be reasonable in one industry but not in another, thus giving it a legally
accepted tool to limit competition in carefully chosen industries and market segments.
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At the firm level, the problem of IP valuation gives rise to a number of strategic
and commercial risks with broad implications for technology managers, absent a
universally applicable IP valuation method. The fecundity of this area of scholarship is
acknowledged but understood to be out-of-scope for this treatise.

1.7

Technology Standards Development
A technology standard is developed and maintained by a consortium of

representative firms, individuals or legal entities operating within an industry. In the ICT
industry, for instance, there are a number of standards organizations with varying levels
of openness, authority, influence, charter and function.
In this context, openness refers to the degree of availability of participation to an
individual, a legal entity, a firm or a governmental agency. Further, the development of
technology standards must meet several goals such as the proper form, fit and function
of the products built to the standard, the precise definition of compliance to facilitate
the interoperability of products, and, most importantly, the lowest possible cost in the
development of standards-based products.61
Since technology standards development entails the integration of protected IP,
the implementation of the standard may give rise to IP infringement in the absence of a
licensing regime. The production of low-cost, standards-based products thus
necessitates availability and affordability of licenses to the essential IP required for its
implementation.
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Several factors interact in the complex, multi-dimensional undertaking of
technology standards development such as business-driven innovation, IPR protection
and enforcement, organizational and institutional structures and practices, and the
regulatory environment spanning consumer and environmental protections.62
Inter-firm cooperation within the context of a SDO represents the ultimate
evolution of a collaborative structure due to its ability to retain broad representation of
vested firms in the industry.63
Technology standards development follows a lifecycle comprised of three
phases: Development, Diffusion, and Adoption.64
In the Development phase, the technical content of the standard is created. The
issue in this phase centers on the ownership and licensing of the IP. Firms are motivated
to know who owns what piece of essential IP.
In the Diffusion phase, the technology standard is broadly disseminated to the
ecosystem. The issue in this phase is the protection and retention of the value of the IP
contained in the standard. Firms are motivated by the revenue potential of licensing the
essential IP they hold.
In the Adoption phase, the technology standard is instantiated in various product
offerings. The issue in this phase has to do with compliance to the published standard
and whether or not any firm in the ecosystem holds a privilege or advantage in this
regard. Firms are motivated by the process and timing of conformance to gain time-tomarket advantage over their rivals.
- 25 -

1.8

Intellectual Property Rights Models
IP protection and license availability is an intrinsic aspect of technology

standards development. The monetary potential for IP is sufficient motivation for the
holder of these intellectual assets to devise elaborate policies to protect them from
unwanted or illegal use. There are on-going conflicts between industrialized and
developing regions of the world, and the controversies surrounding the variant levels of
protection of intellectual assets.65
There exists a variety of IPR models in the ICT industry which span the polar
opposites of “no license” to “free license.” The former is clear: the IP holder has no
motivation or obligation to license its intellectual assets to any entity in any manner.
The latter is equally clear: the IP holder has no intention to bar any entity from using its
intellectual assets and will not impose any monetary obligations for its use. However,
most IP holders use other models that grant them the potential to derive monetary gain
should they choose to assert their rights to the essential IP in their possession.
The IPR model is set by the standards setting organization and it plays a crucial
role in the diffusion and adoption of the technology standard defined by the
organization. Typically, it meets several conditions such as identifying the scope of the
essential patent(s), including the unambiguous availability of license terms covering the
patent(s), and providing commitment to license the essential patent(s).
While the IPR policies of the various ISDOs, SDOs and SIGs are not always
uniform, most organizations have gravitated towards the RAND licensing policy as it is
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the most preferred option available. There are variations in RAND, such as RAND with
royalty-free (RAND-RF) terms, sometimes referred to as RAND with zero royalty (RANDZ), and others such as RAND with covenant not to sue (RAND-CNTS).
The “non-discriminatory” part of RAND is clear: IP licensing must be available to
all takers. The “reasonable” part of RAND, however, is not clear and is subject to varying
interpretations. There is no uniform semantic for reasonableness, especially across
industrial boundaries. This is one example of the difficulty in setting and adhering to an
IPR policy. On the other end of the scale, the “Just Publish” model is rarely used as it can
expose the adopter to potentially onerous terms, and it does not meet the
aforementioned criteria. In this model the owner makes the IP in question publicly
available with or without the protections afforded by law and may, at an indeterminate
time, assert rights against it absent prior notice. The increased uncertainty inherent in
this model renders it unpopular.

1.9

Research Motivation
The co-evolution of IPR policies with standards setting organizations in the ICT

industry and the uncertainties and challenges posed by these trends has the potential to
hinder technological innovation and the free flow of information across firm boundaries.
Technology standardization is beset by IP concerns that create conflict and pose
challenges for technology managers. Much of these threats emanate from the nuanced
differences in the entrenched IPR models across standards developing organizations.
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Moreover, IPR policy impacts competition in a number of ways such as the pace of
innovation and its impact on the evolution of market structures. 66
The ineffectiveness of static structures, such as antitrust enforcement, in a
dynamic and evolving setting like the ICT industry highlights the need for vigilance in
managing the relationship between competition policy and IPR.67 My motivation in
undertaking this research is to probe the various considerations that inform the decision
to participate in SDOs by ICT firms and to develop a decision-support model to fill an
existing void. Reliable and generalizable models to guide decisions on technology
standardization and IP portfolio valuation, and their integration into the firm’s
innovation strategy, have not received adequate scholarly attention.
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Chapter 2:

Literature Review

The literature on the impact of standards development on product and process
innovation builds on the groundbreaking work of Utterback and Abernathy (1975), in
which they recorded patterns of innovation within technology firms and developed
various models to explain the rate of innovation of products and processes on the basis
of the firm’s chosen business and competitive strategy.68 One of the main upshots of
this research suggests that technology firms race to propagate their own
implementation of a technological innovation in order to establish de facto standards
which others will have to emulate. In applying the Utterback and Abernathy model to
the firm’s strategic alliances, Mauri and McMillan (1999) find that technology-intensive
firms form alliances as the level of technology complexity and cross-dependencies
increase.69 Their findings buttress the Uterback and Abernathy product and process
innovation models and contradict a large body of research which contends that
technology firms avoid alliances to protect their intellectual assets from exploitative and
opportunistic behaviors of their rivals, partners and others in their ecosystem. In the
sections below, I shall detail the mainstream literature on technology standardization as
well as provide a brief review of some supporting streams of inquiry.

2.1

Mainstream Standards Literature
David and Greenstein (1990) catalog a comprehensive survey of literature on

technology standardization with a focus on the economics of compatibility standards.70
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One of the main themes emerging from their study highlights the so-called “bandwagon
effects” which explicates the economic gains from the coordination of different agents
to achieve interoperability of components within a system. This is the phenomenon
where ICT managers mimic the technology standardization behaviors and actions of
keystone firms without deep analysis of their implications.
Another theme is centered on the concept of “positive feedback,” where the
increased adoption of a technology standard reinforces even broader adoption over
time. This finding poses an interesting question: given positive feedback, will the market
gravitate towards optimal standards on its own? When a presumably new compatibility
standard is introduced, is it systemically bound for failure in its formulation, adoption
and evolution? These researchers point out that markets which are characterized by
consumption externalities do not always an optimal choice in a technology standard
since choices made by early adopters wield an unduly large influence over late adopters.
Ozsomer and Cavusgil (2000) discuss the effects of technology standardization
on network externalities and show that once a standard has emerged its rapid adoption
can trigger competition in the short term leading to lower cost in the long term.71 Zhu,
et al. (2005) examine how network effects promote the diffusion of technology
standards through switching costs and path dependencies by developing an integrative
model that includes influential factors in the migration to open standards, and argue for
migration from proprietary to open standards across organizational boundaries.72
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The importance of technology standards development for the purpose of
reinvigorating the US economy and renewing the competitiveness of US technology
firms is strongly emphasized by Burnside and Witkin (2008) who confirm the futility of
the go-it-alone approach and point to alarming statistics concerning the decline of US
technological prowess.73 For instance, measured as a percentage, in 2004 the US was
overtaken in the issuance of science and engineering degrees by China, Japan and
Ireland. Further, in 2005 US R&D as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was
below that of China, Ireland, Russia and the EU. These researches contend that the lack
of an IP licensing arrangement between university R&D and the industry is the key
obstacle in maintaining a steady flow of technological innovation and business
collaboration. These findings parallel the contention of Cohen, et al. (2002), that patent
spillover and associated R&D diffusion is stronger in Japan than in the U. S. 74 Echoing
similar sentiments, Pisano and Shih (2009) draw a bleak picture of the gradual decline of
the US technology industry in its inability to produce its own innovations and
inventions.75 These researchers call for focused research and development as well as
closer collaboration between business, academia and government to restore US
technological competitiveness. This advice hearkens to a few decades back when a
similar alarm was sounded over the declining US prowess in semiconductor
manufacturing, which gave birth to the collaborative arrangement called Sematech.76
As a consortium of the leading semiconductor manufacturing firms, Sematech
members pool their research and development in a collaborative manner for the benefit
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of the consortium in order to ward off the perceived unfair advantages of governmentsubsidized R&D by overseas competitors.77 Collaborative innovation is not alien to
American firms. However, the evolving process of technological change has a profound
effect on the development, diffusion and adoption of technology standards. 78
In studying the increasingly rapid pace of technological innovation, Coyle (2005)
finds that technology standards can pace innovation by providing stability in a time of
constant change.79 Thus, standards organizations must maintain a steady beat rate of
technological innovation and reach across other standards organizations for
coordination and influence to build consistency and dependency within the ecosystem.
Using the paradigm of a pyramid, Coyle maintains that technology standards form its
base through which firms can specialize in the development of tools and other
technology-based products to enable the development of more advanced innovations
and applications, a layer above on the pyramid.
Consider that semiconductor manufacturers rely on a host of sophisticated
factory tools, such as reliability and measurement equipment, to streamline and
automate their operations. In turn, these tools may be based on certain standards in
order to engender multiple sourcing and choice. Thus, technology standards facilitate
competition as well as innovation.
In an award-winning study on the diffusion of competing standards in two-sided
markets, Sun and Tse (2006) find that network effects overshadow technological
superiority in determining the outcome of conflicting standards, in that strong network
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effects locked in an inferior standard even though a superior standard was available.80
This implies that in defining technology standards new entrants must have superior
technologies or financial resources to succeed as latecomers or when there is already a
standard in place. By coining terms such as “single-home” (i.e. the adoption of one
standard by a firm) and “multi-home” (i.e. the adoption of multiple standards by a firm)
these researchers draw distinctions between a variety of models where a given standard
can merely survive in the face of multiple options or completely dominate the field and
drive out other standards. One clear implication from this study is particularly
instructive: the tendency to multi-home will result in multiple standards, but there will
be a gradual convergence of multiple standards towards a harmonious steady state. The
reigning in of a potentially obstreperous environment into focus and predictability is
requisite to the organic evolution of a business ecosystem. In this manner, a firm that is
contemplating investing in technology standards development or participating in an
existing standards activity can have a better sense of its potential payback.
Riley (2007) likens technology standards to elements of a competitive strategy in
which market and firm-specific factors moderate the effectiveness of decisions and
actions taken in the development of standards.81 This firm’s history of standards
activities, its assets, the characteristics of the technology in question and the
characteristics of the market are all influencing factors in the success achieved by the
firm in pursuing a technology standard.
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An interesting, but often overlooked, point about the willingness and funding of
personnel for technology standards development activity is raised by Blind (2006) who
contends that standards work results in the flow of R&D primarily from large, wellfunded and resourced firms to smaller and less-resourced counterparts.82 The
implication being that industry leaders with high R&D output must be wooed by the
standards developing ecosystem with favorable licensing terms as incentive to
counterbalance the net outflow of R&D output from large to small firms. Another
implication is related to the resource requirements of technology standards
development. Large firms are more able to afford assigning their talented employees to
these tasks while the same may be apocryphal for small or medium-sized firms. Thus,
the latter may be chronically under-represented in influencing the direction of
technology standards development which may necessitate external policies, such as
government, to goad these firms into active participation and positive contribution.
Waguespack and Fleming (2009) examined the role of startup firms in
technology standards development and found that participation in standards activities
greatly accelerated a “liquidity event.”83 The surprising finding here is that technology
adoption, per se, was not the sole benefit for the startup but that simply attending
standards organization meetings and conferences provided a sufficient level of exposure
to exert influence, establish relationships with others in the ecosystem, and thus gain
traction for the startup firm’s technological innovations. This important finding
highlights the impact of relationships within technology standards developing regimes.
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Consistent with this finding, Harryson (2008) reports on the importance of relationship
management for startup firms to balance technological explorations with industrial
exploitations.84 An implication of this study suggests that by building relationships, R&D
managers can establish bridges to “previously disconnected disciplines and areas of
value creating activities to drive creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.”

2.2

Multiple Perspectives
A substantial portion of the academic literature on standards development and

its association to technological innovation in the ICT industry is organized along various
perspectives such as Economic, Strategic, Organizational, and Legal (ESOL). These
perspectives indicate the primary emphases and foci of the scholars. There are ancillary
streams of inquiry such as innovation management, modularity and so on. Here, I shall
outline the key findings in the ESOL perspectives.
2.2.1 Economic
Farrell and Saloner form a duo of economists with prolific contributions to the
standards literature. In a seminal study, Farrell and Saloner (1985) examine the
standardization trap to determine if the process of standards development can confine
an industry on an obsolete or inferior technology path.85 In a follow-up study (1986),
these same researchers expound on the network effects of compatibility standards and
show the effect of established technologies and the incentives for the adoption of
newer standards-based technologies.86 They posit that in the presence of an installed
base, the early adopters of a new technology standard bear a disproportionate
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transition cost. In examining compatibility through converters overlaid on a standard,
Farrell and Saloner (1992) establish that compatibility is a matter of degree and that a
degree of compatibility can be achieved ex post at a cost.87 Their findings imply that the
economic benefit of converters is limited, at best, and the models they proffer are static
in nature and do not comprehend the issues inherent in a dynamic milieu. Along the
same stream of enquiry, Simcoe (2003) acknowledges the high-stakes nature of
standards development in the presence of strong network effects and studies the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to determine the relationship between the
commercial stakes of the standards process with the length of the decision-making
process in a standardization committee.88
In examining the economic and technological significance of standards
organizations, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) consider patent disclosure distributions and
find that SSOs play a key role in the adoption of the standards they develop.89 Simcoe
(2006) further explores the inherent tensions between cooperation and competition in
the standards creation process and finds that the shift towards an “open innovation”
model by some technology firms has increased controversy surrounding IPR strategy
and licensing policy. Simcoe believes that aggressive IPR strategies can reduce the
expected value of a technology standard.90
Katz and Shapiro form another duo of economists with copious contributions to
the standards literature. In a ground-breaking study, Katz and Shapiro (1985a) consider
R&D rivalry and find that major innovations will not be licensed but that minor
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innovations constitute better candidates for licensing by efficient firms.91 These same
researchers (1985b) show that the desire for standardization by a firm can vary with its
position in the market (i.e. its market share).92 In an important subsequent study Katz
and Shapiro (1986a) analyze technology adoption in industries with strong network
externalities and find that adoption depends on sponsorship and that sponsors exercise
great influence on the ecosystem through investments to promote their technologies. 93
In a related study, Katz and Shapiro (1986b) examine the optimal licensing strategy of
research labs that compete with their licensees and show, inter alia, that a profitmaximizing strategy is not always in the licensor’s advantage.94 In studying the behavior
of rival firms in a dynamic setting, Katz and Shapiro (1987) find that the dissemination of
innovation through licensing is only pursued if the innovation is deemed to be of minor
value by the innovating firms in order to discourage imitation by its rivals.95 Continuing
to expound on their network externalities model, Katz and Shapiro (1992) find, counterintuitively, that markets exhibit a propensity to rush into new, incompatible
technologies and that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against
compatibility as it establishes its own product as the standard.96 In another important
study, Katz and Shapiro (1994) explore the economics of complementary innovations.
They highlight the need to further analyze linkages between hardware and software to
better understand the dynamics of standards adoption in light of the ambiguity over the
formation of coalitions and the behaviors of standards consortia, and to develop a more
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sophisticated grasp of incentives for innovation in the face of uncertain technological
progress.97
Sherry and Teece (2004) investigate the changing value of patents and find an
increase in value as patents are infringed upon or lead to litigation.98 This has a direct
bearing on the desire on the part of ICT firms to participate in SDOs in order to take
advantage of the available IPR protections. In their investigation of the optimal licensing
fee structure and model, Kulatilaka and Lin (2006) find the investment threshold to be
monotonically decreasing in the intensity of network effects and the level of uncertainty
as the investing firm pursues technology standards.99 Further, Lin and Kulatilaka (2006)
show the impact of network effects on licensing choice and find that a fixed-fee regime
is optimal in the presence of strong networks. In other words, with increasing intensity
of the network externalities, the optimality of licensing shifts from a royalty regime to a
fee regime.100 Lin (2011) delves deeper into the problem of patent “thickets” and
mathematically demonstrates the compound effect of patent stacking, where one
patent depends on another and can lead to excessive royalty burdens for the licensee.
She shows that patent thickets do not necessarily lead to “double marginalization” but
depend on the form of license.101
Grossman and Lai (2004) examine the incentives used by governments to protect
IPR by considering two hypothetical countries, “north” and “south,” and develop
economic models to explain the trade-off between increased innovations that result
from a dynamic policy in an open economy with the competitive pricing of IP that ensue
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from a static policy in a closed economy.102 Their findings confirm that large markets for
innovative products compel governments to grant strong IP protection, while smaller
economies have virtually no incentives to grant such protections. Schmalensee (2009)
and Gilbert (2010) consider the problem of royalty stacking and patent holdup by
examining policy questions related to participation in standards organizations, and
concludes that SDOs must conduct ex ante IPR pricing “auction” to determine royalty
rates before standards are approved.103 104
An overlooked aspect of standards work is the process through which funding
and financing are procured for its development. Spring and Weiss (1995) have but
barely attempted to address this issue through the development of a framework which
requires further quantitative analysis to yield useful and actionable cost-benefit
assessment to address the chronic under-provisioning problem faced by most
technology standards.105
2.2.2 Strategic
The landmark study of Teece (1986), addressing the question of the benefactors
of innovation, underpins an important body of research that informs much of the
standards literature focused on strategy.106
Figure 3 below depicts the Teece model:
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Figure 3 – The Teece "Profiting from Innovation" model.
Teece points out that when imitation is easy the financial benefits of an
innovation can accrue to providers of complementary assets rather than to the
originator of the innovation. The Teece framework maps the market power of
innovators against the degree of protection of IP appropriability. Teece’s key
contribution in this regard is the strategic roadmap for innovators and imitators as they
interact with complementary assets providers to increase the value of the original
innovation. In a subsequent study, Teece (1998) proffers important models for the
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optimal exploitation of intangible assets such as knowledge, competence and IP, and
observes that these assets form the basis of competitive differentiation in many sectors
of the ICT industry.107
Many scholars have built on Teece’s landmark findings. For instance Egyedi
(1996) observes that standardization of technology is an endogenous factor for the firm
engaged in its development.108 In other words, participation in standards consortia
enable the firm to be aware of its ecosystem and to react quickly to its feedback loop by
adjusting internal strategies and resource allocations. This is largely in agreement with
Schmidt and Werle (1998) who maintain that standardization facilitates and coordinates
technology development in an orderly and predictable manner within the firm.109
Jacobides, et al. (2006) extend Teece’s original question of ways to protect innovation
for reaping maximum benefits, and reshape the argument to one of finding value
regardless of imitation by proposing structural dynamics of efficiency over control and
by providing concrete templates for consideration by managers.110
Tao, et al. (2005) posit a set of strategies to organize intellectual assets to
facilitate value extraction beyond that created by implementing these assets in
technology-intensive products and services.111 Pisano (2006) re-examines the notion of
appropriability and shows that a “tight” regime, that is one with strong IP protection, is
not advantageous to the firm given the changes in the industry brought about by the
open source phenomenon.112 Rose, et al. (2007) posits that a properly constructed IP
policy will benefit the firm and its shareholders by boosting the firm’s stock price. 113
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Egyedi (2010) points to some dysfunctional behaviors in the market that require active
involvement by the government to mitigate, such as the non-standard use of cell phone
chargers, which in 2008 alone were estimated at 1.2 billion worldwide, or competing
standards that seek to accomplish the same result which, without corrective
intervention by governments, can result in market confusion and sub-optimal user
experience.114 These failures in standardization can lead to lack of market transparency,
incompatibility, inefficiency and waste in resource usage, and the dampening of
innovation.
Besen and Farrell (1994) analyze the determinants of, and proffer strategies for,
firms that participate in standards development in a horizontal market model. 115 They
point out that by promoting or preventing the adoption of their preferred technology
standards firms drastically affect competition and ascribe large benefits for themselves
by prevailing in the establishment of an “architectural franchise” through which their
chosen standards gain dominance. Farrell and Simcoe (2012) examines the tradeoffs
between speed and quality of outcome within formal standards organizations and finds
that consensus-building in a voluntary organization can lead to war of attrition and
ultimately to suboptimal outcomes.116
Updegrove (1995) was among the first to outline the strategic intent behind
keystone firms’ participation in standards organizations for market advantage, the
emerging IPR policy issues, as well as the evolutionary trajectory of standards
organizations into national or international consortia.117 With regard to the strategic
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investment in technology standards development, Kulatilaka and Lin (2004) consider
firms with temporary monopoly opportunities and find a tipping point for licensing fees
that can assure the investing firm an adequate return as well as the coalescence of the
industry around a single standard, thus avoiding the repercussions of fragmentation that
can result from multiple and competing standards.118
Tassey (2000) discusses the effects of standardization on technology innovation
and diffusion and confirms that US industry and government managers are beginning to
rethink their laissez faire attitude towards technology standards by realizing that
standards constitute a form of technical infrastructure and thus have considerable
public good.119
Blind and Thumm (2004) explore the relationship between patenting and
standardization strategies and report, counter-intuitively, that firms with higher patent
intensity have a lower propensity to join a standards developing organization.120 This
finding implies that if keystone firms with strong technological base stay away from the
standardization process then both the quality of the standard and its diffusion will
suffer.
Seo (2007) considers the process by which organizations make decisions about
involvement in standards work by integrating the “Actor Network” and the “SelfOrganized Complexity” theories into a framework for a holistic understanding of this
decision-making process.121 Seo identifies six fundamental elements for an organization
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to consider in ICT standardization, one of which is IPR, and confirms that essential IP
provides a strategic advantage to its holder in this context.
In addressing the attempts to mitigate patent holdups, to force the disclosure of
essential patents by their holders prior to the adoption of a standard, and to amend
RAND terms with proportionality and maximum rents, Geradin (2006) argues that these
measure ossify bilateral negotiations between patent owners and their implementers,
constrain the licensing strategies of firms with large IP portfolios, create delays in the
implementation of technological innovations, and lead to flawed mechanisms in
allocating royalties among owners and users of IP.122
With a perspective on the impact of globalization on business competition, Basu
and Waymire (2008) show that intangible assets such as ideas and knowledge
embedded in patents and other forms of IP have taken on dramatic importance as value
drivers of business in developed economies.123 They contend that these intangible are a
potential source of revenue but that few companies actually report stand-alone
valuation of these assets due to challenges in current accounting practices.
In recognizing the great disparity in technology standardization and IPR policy
setting between the West and the emerging markets elsewhere in the world, DeNardis
(2009) argues for greater openness in ICT standards development through government
procurement policies and corporate strategies.124
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2.2.3 Organizational
The standardization of technology implies an agreement to do certain things in
an open, prescribed and uniform manner, in contrast to a closed environment. Farrell,
Monroe and Saloner (1998) confirm that firms prefer closed vertical organization to
open vertical organization even though the latter may be socially more desirable.125
Farrell and Saloner (1988) consider the question of coordination within committees of
standards organizations and find that committees are by and large efficient means of
coordination in standards development.126
Nelson, Shaw and Qualls (2005) find that industrial groups increasingly leverage
the use of non-profit, voluntary-consensus standards development consortia to
proliferate technology standards.127 These researchers propose a model that that
disaggregates technology standards development into six distinct activities.
Regazzoni and Rizzi (2011) introduce organization structures for the autonomous
management of IP portfolios.128 Using the TRIZ methodology, these researchers seek to
map out the process of IP creation and look for sensitivities and optimization points in
the overall creative process of IP generation. By studying patents in this way,
organizations can examine patterns and continuously look for innovation possibilities
through incremental optimizations in processes and organizations.
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) demonstrate that innovation teams can efficiently
interact with outsiders, such as standards development organizations, and discuss the
nature of the external activities and their link to the organizations overall
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performance.129 Rindova, Petkova and Kotha (2007) discuss the continuous morphing of
organizational structures to remain competitive in fast-moving environments and draw
parallels to technology standards organizations.130 Lichtenhaler (2008) shows how
absorptive and desorptive capacity can be used to transfer technology across
organizational boundaries with implications for technology standards bodies.131 132
2.2.4 Legal
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) examine patenting behavior of the top 100
semiconductor firms during the “pro-patent” shift in the United States legal
environment and find, paradoxically, a dramatic rise in patenting of intellectual assets
among semiconductor firms that are historically not known for reaping returns on R&D
investments through patenting.133 Lemley (2002) provides a comprehensive survey of
the legal aspects of technology standardization vis-a-vis the law and outlines four basic
tenets: 1-the practical uses of IP and the rules that govern such use, 2-the organic
diversity among standards organizations in the way they treat IPR, 3-the restrictive
nature of age-old antitrust rules in a dynamic environment such as technology
standardization, and 4-the role standards organizations play in ameliorating overlapping
policies in multiple industries.134 Related to this research, Gibson (2007) highlights the
issues of the proper disclosure of IPR and the clear declarations concerning licensing of
these assets as major impediments to the internationalization of technology
standards.135
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In a seminal study Reitzig (2004) outlines recent trends in the use of patents and
the rise of thickets as an IP strategy adopted by ICT firms. Essentially, thickets are
formed when several patents are bulked that may be separable into individual rights but
cannot exclusively be assigned to an economic unit. Reitzig makes an important
distinction in the way patents can be used as strategic leverage between discrete and
complex technologies.136 Simcoe, Graham and Feldman (2009) examine the use of IP by
small and large firms within standards organizations and find that for small firms the
probability of filing a lawsuit increases after the disclosure of essential IP, while the rate
is unchanged for larger firms. Thus, standardization increases the difference in litigious
behavior between small and large innovative firms because smaller firms cannot seek
rents in complementary markets in which larger firms participate.137
From a policy perspective, the government ought to exercise extreme reluctance
to intervene or influence the direction of technology standards development and IPR
policies. This is the view advanced by Baird (2007) in affirming that the ICT industry is
sufficiently sophisticated in regard to standards setting. The U.S. government has a long
historical preference for market independence, international trade agreements limit the
role of government in free enterprise markets, and the ability of governments to stay
informed and to make correct decisions at crucial junctures in technology lifecycle is
severely constrained.138 Baird’s advice is for government to encourage market solutions
through incentives where possible and only intervene where a mandatory technology
standard would provide substantial benefit through the minimization of deviations from
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market norms and the provision of flexible and efficient processes for the revision of
standards to account for technological innovation and evolution. This view is somewhat
countered by Bird (2006) who claims that the U. S. government is showing strong
interest in protecting IP in developing economies, particularly in Brazil, Russia, India and
China (collectively called BRIC).139 China, in particular, is taking a renewed interest in
setting national policy on the development of standards and IP.140 141 142
Commenting on the growing importance of IP assets in high-growth industries
such as software and electronics, Wang (2010) cites Rivette and Kline in observing that
IP law has transformed from dormancy to the driving engine of growth in hightechnology companies.143 Wang stresses, again citing Rivette and Kline that it is a “rare
company … that has any clue whatsoever about how to value, analyze, and structure …
IP asset transfers.”
The weight and magnitude of standards setting in a modern, knowledge-based
economy, according to Layne-Farrar (2010) comes into focus when considering the
crucial role of IPR in setting standards.144 In particular, the author discusses the
disaggregation of the technology industry into design, manufacturing and testing that is
scattered across the globe and is ever more reliant on technology standards as well as
the role of non-practicing entities with large patent portfolios who adopt an offensive IP
licensing strategy. The author cites the case of eBay v. MercExchange where the
concurring opinions of Supreme Court Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Breyer
held “…An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis of
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production and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. …For
those firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”145 146
In confirming the dynamic capabilities and the Shumpeterian notion of
innovation-based competition advanced by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997)147 and the
sustainable competitive advantage made possible through the resource-based view of
the firm first advanced by Barney (1991), Bagley (2008) argues that technology
managers must remain astute to the provision of the law to create and capture value for
the firm, including its intellectual assets.148 Sagers (2010) cautions technology managers
to be aware of antitrust regulations and the liabilities of SDO participation when
standardizing technologies.149 Anton and Yao (1995) provide further insight on these
issues. Courts are likely to find antitrust liability where there are exclusionary provisions
or egregious processes, particularly when those exclusions or processes are not
germane to the development of the standard itself.150
Rai (1999) points out that the issues of IPR in technology research is not limited
to the ownership of intellectual assets but also extends to social norms that govern
claims of ownership. In general, the evolution of law is outpaced by rapid technological
change, legal rules for the application of IPR policy sweep broadly and thus may be
inefficient in doing so, and legal professionals do not always have adequate access to
relevant information pertaining to technological change.151
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Finally, in studying the determinants of essential patent claims, that is those
patents that are deemed indispensable for designing and manufacturing products,
Bekkers, Bongard and Nuvolari (2011) empirically establish that the content of the
claims and the involvement of the claimant in the standardization process itself are de
rigueur in the eventual success of the standard.152

2.3

Summary of the Mainstream Literature
From the preceding survey of the academic literature on technology standards, it

can be surmised that keystone firms influence the direction and pace of technology
innovations through the development of standards (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002), that
technology standards development requires significant investment with high risk of
inadequate returns and is not always a rational choice (Kulitalaka and Lin, 2004), and
that the adoption and diffusion of technology standards is dependent on and facilitated
through network externalities, complementary innovations and market timing (Schilling,
2002). These findings are further buttressed by Gandal (2002).153 Further, it can be seen
that standards-based innovation creates interdependence between firms and facilitates
the pooling of intellectual assets, that complementarity and network effects of
ecosystems is necessary for success of the standardization effort, and that the legal and
regulatory environment for collaboration in SDOs is dynamic and ever-changing.
The key themes that emerge from the review of the mainstream literature on
technology standardization are:
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1. The optimal exploitation of intellectual assets such as knowledge, competence and
IP by the ICT firm to differentiate itself from its competitors;
2. The influence wielded by keystone firms in setting the direction and pace of
technology innovation through the development of technology standards;
3. The timely facilitation of technology diffusion and the enabling of its adoption
through network externalities and ecosystems associated with SDOs; and
4. The requirements for significant investments for the development of technology
standards with high risk of inadequate returns.
There are several peripheral streams of inquiry that are inter-related to the
mainstream literature on technology standardization and are mentioned below for
completeness.

2.4

Auxiliary Streams of Inquiry
In the context of New Product Development (NPD), a large portion of the

literature on standardization in the ICT industry covers compatibility standards. Sahay
and Riley (2003) provide additional perspective by addressing customer interface
standards.154 These researchers show that appropriability regimes have different
impacts on the pursuit of customer interface and compatibility standards. There exists a
considerable body of literature that highlights the advancements and shortcomings of
the notion of modularity and reuse in various technology-based product design and
development. Many research streams are directly or indirectly related to technology
standardization. In particular, there exists a rich set of literature on product innovation
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and modular architecture, some of which is included below. Other bodies of scholarly
work use game theory to probe into inter-organizational collaborations on SDOs. Some
of this research is built on the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm where the
participating organization’s economic and human resources and strategic capabilities
are found to be crucial in its ability to participate in technology standardization.
2.4.1 Innovation Management
In a seminal paper, Henderson and Clark (1990) point out that the traditional
bifurcation of technology innovation as either ‘incremental’ or ‘radical’ is incomplete
and potentially misleading.155 They methodically distinguish between the components
of a product and the ways in which innovations are integrated into that product through
platform architectures and standardized interface points.
Iansiti and Richards (2006) show that technology-intensive industries are
organized as complex and dynamic networks of suppliers, customers, competitors,
assimilators, and value-added resellers.156 Firms in these networks often take on one or
more of these roles at any given time, thus adding to the complexities of collaboration
and communication. Iansiti and Levien (2004) document the phenomenon of the
clustering of technology-based firms into business ecosystems and the roles and
functions discharged by the leader of this coagulation (also called “keystone”).157 The
relationships between firms in an ecosystem often change or morph in unanticipated
ways. A supplier one day can be an assimilator the next and so on. The integrative
model that captures these complex relationships is articulated by Porter (1983). 158 159
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Porter’s “five forces” model has been further extended by Burgelman (2002)160 and is
used by business strategy consultants for the cogency by which it establishes one
central tenant: the interdependence of firms in an ecosystem. This interdependency is
bidirectional and equally applicable to the keystone as it is to the other firms that
belong to the network.
Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) explain the phenomenon of distributed
innovation, whereby firms in an ecosystem—ranging from competitors to
complementors—pool their resources to collaboratively develop and sustain technology
innovation, including standards, for the benefit of their ecosystems.161 By using the
multiplicative benefits inherent in a business ecosystem, technology firms can justify
continued investments for sustained technology innovation and value-added
differentiation. Sawhney and Prandelli have established that for technology-intensive
firms, cooperation and co-dependence are more attractive alternatives to self-reliance,
as market and economic pressures drive firms to constrict their knowledge base,
maximize their expertise and streamline their operations around a band of core
competencies.
Chesbrough (2003) is among the first to identify “open innovation” as a trend
among technology-intensive firms where those firms that cannot afford to invest on
their own innovate by licensing or buying intellectual assets from other firms.162 Hamel
and Prahalad (2005) further highlight a trend where some technology firms beat out
their competition through collaboration with a network of complementors.163 Ernst
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(2005), in confirming Pavitt’s (1999) argument on the link between complex innovations,
such as chip design, and the internationalization of semiconductor manufacturing,
discovers that the methodological changes intended to improve chip production instead
yield increased cognitive and organizational complexity such that some products require
a large number of designers with specialized and diverse capabilities. He further
establishes that geographic proximity can become a disadvantage by empirically
confirming the Granstrand, et al. (1993) and Cantwell (1995) suggestions that the
“centrifugal” forces of geographical decentralization are stronger than the “centripetal”
forces of geographic centralization that link multiple, dispersed innovation centers.164
Technology standards development facilitates inter-firm collaboration by
providing well-understood interface points. Commenting on the emerging modular
market structure in the technology industry, Iansiti (2005) posits that “the days of the
lone wolf are over,” and “standing alone is no longer a viable business model.”165
2.4.2 Modularity
Modular product design has ushered in a continuous stream of innovations
around common product platforms and architectures that enhance product variety and
mass customization capability, enable rapid upgradability to meet changing market
needs, provide for economies of scale and scope, increase the pace of parallel
development, improve product design flexibility while decreasing development costs,
facilitate shorter product development times and allow for efficient recombination of
resources to achieve corporate strategies.
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Modularity—the technique that enables the disaggregation of a monolithic
structure into discrete and atomic parts, one or more of which can be juxtaposed to
form a variety of products based upon a common, standardized architecture using
known interface points, which can be scaled along several axes such as functionality,
reliability, price, etcetera, to satisfy varying usage models and market needs—is an
intrinsic byproduct of technology standards development. Ulrich (1995) defines
modularity as “the relative property of a product’s architecture.” 166 For Ulrich, the
physical elements that comprise a product are chunked along functional components
that implement one or more functions in their entirety and the inter-chunk interactions
are well-defined along interface points. Further, Ulrich sees modular product
architecture as one that “…includes a one-to-one mapping from functional elements in
the function in structure to the physical components of the products.”
Baldwin and Clark (1997) define modularity as “building a complex product or
process from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function
together as a whole.”167 In adapting McClelland and Rumelhart (1995), Baldwin and
Clark (2000) further state that “…a module is a unit whose structural elements are
powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements
in other units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of
modularity.”168 The Baldwin and Clark definition of modularity is premised on the
relationship between structures and not on functions, while Ulrich emphasizes the
functional characteristics of the structural modules.
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Product architecture enables the systematic and predictable proliferation of a
family of products that are sourced from a common set of well-known interface points,
components, parts and other technology building blocks. Zwernik, et al. (2007) consider
product architecture as “a translation of functional requirements into physical
definitions of building blocks.”169 In a sense, product architecture facilitates the
methodical and the procedural development of technology-intensive products by
bringing together experiential knowledge and techniques with the theoretical
underpinnings of proven methodologies to create a common base of technologies, or a
platform, which can shorten development time, enhance design quality and enable the
firm to meet a broad range of customer preferences and needs. The iPod from Apple is a
recent example of a well-architected product platform. The Apple iPod classic, iPod
nano, iPod shuffle and iPod touch, to name a few, constitute different models of a
product family, all of which are constructed from a common platform and modules, with
each member of the product family having a variable range of capabilities and functions.
Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) documented the concept of product architecture and
consider a technology-based product to be comprised of functional and physical
elements. The former are the operations associated with the product, while the latter
are the parts, components and assemblies that implement the product’s functions.170
Ulrich (1995) bifurcates product architecture into “modular” and “integral” types and
stratifies modular architecture into “slot,” “bus” or “sectional” typology.171 According to
Ulrich, a modular architecture includes “a one-to-one mapping from functional
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elements in the function structure to the physical components of the product, and
specifies de-coupled interfaces between components.” An integral architecture, on the
other hand, includes “a complex, non-one-to-one, mapping from functional elements to
physical components and/or coupled interfaces between components.” The automobile
radio is an example of slot modularity, while the addition of an expansion card in a
personal computer is deemed as bus modularity, and office partitions and piping typify
sectional modularity.
In whatever form, modular architectures facilitate product change, enable
product variety, increase component standardization, and reduce product development
time. The so-called “delayed differentiation” of a product, according to Ulrich and
Eppinger (2008), is a key benefit of a modular architecture that allows decisions to be
deferred about localization or customization of products to maximize appeal to
customers and to enlarge the total available market.172 Technology innovation through
modular design principles is possible only if there are standards that clearly define
interface points and provide agreed-upon interoperability guidelines.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the concept of modularity in
technology-based product design took on added importance, especially in the
development of automotive,173 aircrafts,174 household appliances,175 IT and enterprise
computers and computing solutions,176 177 178 179 180 181 as well as other technologybased industries. 182 183 184 185 186 187
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Studies have shown the manner in which modularity can influence market
evolution and induce product proliferation through rivalry and competition. Modularity
leads to products that can be systematically upgraded to meet evolving customer needs
that modular product development positively impacts the innovation capabilities of the
and that modularity hastens organizational learning through concentration on a few set
of interface points and well-defined modules.188 189 The counter-argument, put forth by
Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001), posits that focused learning can lead to a myopic
viewpoint which in turn can engender a loss of focus on the broader learning and
innovation opportunities that could otherwise be available.190 Greater degrees of design
modularity and higher levels of IT infrastructure flexibility enhance the operational
performance of the firm through optimized supply chain responsiveness.191 In this vein,
modularity is attributed to the co-evolution of vertical outsourcing and horizontal
consolidation in electronics manufacturing and the rise of the contract manufacturing
industry.192 193
To recap, modular designs facilitate the outsourcing of non-critical components
through network alliances, thereby resulting in the efficient operation of the firm
through focus on higher priority activities.194 Modular designs allow large conglomerates
to obtain operational dexterity in responding to dynamic market changes by
recombining resources to maintain their market presence and competitiveness.195 There
are multiple linkages between product architecture and industry structure, and these
linkages explain the observed intra-industry heterogeneity across firms.196 197 The
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reduction in the volume of information and the amount of knowledge sharing made
possible through the codification of standardized design rules allows the firm to pursue
outsourcing strategies within its ecosystem. 198 199 200 201

2.5

Summary of Research Streams
The literature referenced above describes how standards-based product

architecture benefits the firm and positions it for market success through the rapid
proliferation of innovative products made possible by open standards. Technology
standards facilitate revenue opportunities for firms that invest in innovations which end
up in open standards and thus grant the innovating firm the opportunity to derive
revenues from the licensing of its intellectual assets. Licensing terms depend on the
marginal costs prevalent in upstream and downstream markets. The literature on
technology standards affirms that upstream firms in the ICT industry do not experience
high marginal costs but that downstream firms can run into a variety of problems such
as ambushes and thickets. Much of this research employs economic theories to describe
various stimuli that engender standards development in the ICT industry. Table 6 below
shows a non-exhaustive selection of the research streams already discussed:
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Table 6 – Select research streams in the academic literature (non-exhaustive).
Author(s)
David,
Greenstein

Title
Economics of compatibility
standards

Cohen,
Goto, et al

R&D spillovers and incentives
to innovate

Spring,
Weiss

Standardization in
technology-based markets
Financing the standards
development process

Lin,
Kulatilaka

Network effects and tech
licensing w/ fixed fee

Tassey

Kulatilaka
Farrell,
Saloner
Gandal

Investment in technology
standardization
Standardization, compatibility
and innovation
Compatibility, standardization
& network effects

Gans, Sterns

Incumbency and R&D
incentives

Gruber,
Verboven

Evolution of markets under
entry and standards

Teece,
Pisano,
Shuen

Dynamic capabilities and
strategic management

Besen,
Farrell
Hax, Wilde
Szykman, et
al
Clark
Krogh,
Cusumano
Cusumano

Choosing how to compete:
strategies and tactics in
standardization
Delta model: adaptive
management for a changing
world
A foundation for
interoperability in next-gen …
Interaction of design
hierarchies and market
Three strategies for managing
fast growth
How Microsoft makes large
teams work like small teams

Porter

Strategy and the internet

Harrigan

Joint ventures and
competitive strategy

Focus
Broad survey of literature on technology
standardization
Patent sharing (intra-industry R&D
knowledge) more in Japan than US;
patents used for negotiation in Japan
Effects of standardization on technology
innovation and diffusion
Framework for examining the financing of
technology standards development
Impact of network effects on licensing
choice; fixed fee found to be optimal in
strong networks
Optimal licensing fee and investment
threshold
Can standards trap firms into becoming
inferior
Economics of compatibility and
standardization is mainstream
Threat to engage in imitative R&D
increases leverage, incumbents research
more than entrants
Effect of government policies on evolution
of an industry; single standards
accelerates technology adoption
Sources and methods of wealth creation;
wealth not created by blocking
competitors

Perspective

Economic

Strategy to compete within a standard vs.
competing between standards
Triangle: three strategic options (low cost,
differentiation, lock-in)
Enhanced interoperability for backwards
and future product development
Nature of technology evolution impacts
dynamics of competition and
management of innovation
The key to healthy corporate life is steady
growth; scaling, duplication, granulation
How smaller teams can be more effective
than larger teams in product innovation
Importance of companies to differentiate
through strategy; internet is only an
enabling strategy
Impact of particular industry traits upon
firms' options in pursuing them
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Strategic

Dosi

Technological paradigms and
technology trajectories

Schilling

Technology success and
failure in winner-take-all

Teece

Profiting from technological
innovation

Simcoe,
Graham,
Feldman

Competing on standards?

IP strategies for small and large firms

Chellappa,
Shivendu

Economic implications of
variable tech standards

Analytical model to study implications of
maintaining different/incompatible
technology standards

Hemphill

Firm patent strategies in US
technology standards
development

Firm patent strategy matrix

Soh

Network patterns and
competitive advantage …

Ancona,
Caldwell
Lichtenhaler

Bridging the boundary:
external process and
performance
Technology transfer across
org boundaries

Continuous changes and discontinuities in
technological innovation
Technology standards driven by network
externalities AND the firm's learning and
market timing
Innovative firms often do not benefit from
innovation due to strategy, licensing and
public policy

Central firms w/ high ego density and
willingness to share knowledge achieved
better innovation
How teams interact with outsiders; nature
of external activities and link to
performance
Absorptive and desorptive capacity

Hirtz, Stone,
et al.
Farrell,
Monroe,
Saloner
Farrell,
Saloner

Functional basis for
engineering design

Migration from proprietary to open
standards across organizational
boundaries
Integrates research from NIST and
universities

The vertical organization of
industry

Preferences of firms for closed vertical
standards setting organizations

Coordination through
committees and markets

Nelson,
Shaw, Qualls

Interorganizational system
standards development

Coordination within committees of
standards setting organizations
Industrial groups leveraging the use of
non-profit, voluntary-consensus standards
development consortia

Regazzoni,
Rizzi

A TRIZ based approach to
manage innovation and
intellectual property …

Organizational structures for the
autonomous management of IP

Bekkers,
Duysters,
Verspagen

Intellectual property rights,
strategic tech…

Investigates the role of IP rights in shaping
the GSM standard

Open standards and
intellectual property rights
Market- and committee based
mechanisms in
standardization

Investigates the inherent tensions
between cooperation and competition

Zhu, et al.

Simcoe
Funk, Methe

Migration to open-standard
inter-organizations

Influence of governments on creation of
standards-based products
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Org

Legal

Hall,
Ziedonis
Lemley

Gibson

Reitzig
Baird

The patent paradox revisited:
an empirical study of patents
in the ICT industry
Intellectual property rights
and standards setting
organizations
Globalization and the
technology standards game
The private value of thickets
and fences
Government at the standards
bazaar

Wang

Rise of the patent
intermediaries

Layne-Farrar

Business models and the
standards setting process

Examines patenting behavior of the top
100 semiconductor firms during the “pro
patent” shift in the US legal environment
Comprehensive survey of the legal aspects
of technology standardization vis-à-vis the
law
Disclosure of IPR and declarations
concerning licensing of patents as
impediments to international
standardization
Recent trends in the use of patents and
the rise of thickets
Analytical framework for government
involvement in technology standards
IP law transformation from dormancy to
the driving engine of growth in hightechnology firms
Role of IPR in defining technology
standards

- 62 -

Chapter 3:

Research Gaps and Questions

From the thoroughgoing review of the academic literature, I have identified
several gaps that will be discussed in this section and linked to the research question
that lies at the core of my research.

3.1

Gaps in the Academic Literature
The most prominent deliberation in the literature on innovation and technology

standardization can be traced to Teece (1986) and his “profiting from innovation” model
which boils down to the following question: should technological innovations that are
subsumed in standards be licensed and for how much, or should these innovations be
given away as open standards to engender broad adoption by the industry, even by
competitors? Some scholars such as Kulitalika and Lin (2004, 2006) have proposed
mathematical models to optimize licensing fees for the innovating firm, while other
scholars such as Katz and Shapiro (1985), Leibowitz and Margolis (1994) and Shapiro and
Varian (1999) believe that network effects alone can accrue sufficient value and utility
from the use of standards for both the investing firm as well as the consumer of such
goods.
Pisano (2006) highlights a major gap in the Teece model whose formulation
takes for granted an IPR appropriability regime that is determined exogenously to the
firm. Pisano points out that this formulation misses the shift to endogenous regimes
where the behavior of the firm can significantly vitiate or bolster its IPR appropriability
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and the total value of its innovation through complementary assets. Simcoe (2005)
echoes Teece when he debates the tension between value creation and value capture
inherent in the creation of technology standards.202
David and Greenstein (1990) discuss two distinct themes that reflect the robust
debate on the economic issues in the mainstream standards literature. To wit,
competition among products that adopt differing standards engenders interoperability
and compatibility problems for the consumer, and results in inventory proliferation for
the firm. Also, ICT firms are faced with intense pressures to make their product
compatible with rival offerings in order to provide choice and variety. The upshot of
these trends puts downward pressure on innovation and the spillover effect negatively
impacts recoupment of R&D investments. Soh (2010) has shown that ICT firms that
exhibit transparent intent and flexibility in adopting and promoting product
compatibility stand a better chance of market success. 203
Aside from Gawer and Cusumano (2002), there is little attention paid to firms’
incentives to provide resources to advance the work of standards organizations, and
even less work has been done to probe the manner in which technologies are selected
to be standardized by these organizations. Lemley (2002) and Gibson (2007) point out a
major gap in the rules governing IPR disclosure and licensing in a sweeping survey of
forty-plus standards organizations. While the heterogeneity in these IPR rules are a
recognized gap that have been the topic of studies by other scholars, including the
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ambiguous definitions for the various licensing regimes, the issue of IP valuation is not
adequately addressed.
Other streams of inquiry expose the debates on the merits and pitfalls of SDO
formation. These consortia provide a counterweight to large keystone firms with
significant market power, such as Microsoft (Hawkins, 1999); however, cooperation
among large firms on defining standards can give rise to collusion and run afoul of
antitrust laws. Most scholars are agreed that when it comes to evaluating IP for
monetary value or for deciding whether to contribute IP to facilitate downstream
business opportunity, the literature and research-based models are sparse. These
scholars include Cerqueti and Ventura (2009), Vickers (2009), Langlois (1999), Pitkethly
(1997), and others.204 205 206 207 Given the richness of the literature surrounding
technology standards, the most germane gaps pertaining to my research question are
summarized in Table 7 below:
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Table 7 - Gaps in the academic literature.
Research Theme
Optimal
exploitation of
intellectual assets
(knowledge,
patents, etc.)
Influence on the
direction and pace
of technology
innovation
Facilitation of
technology
standards adoption
through ecosystems
Significant
investments with
high risk of
inadequate returns

3.2

Findings

Gaps

Technology standards development
requires simultaneous coordination
across several stages of innovation and
production

Model to assess risks and benefits of
investments in IP development and
contribution to technology standards

Keystone firms set standardization
agenda and create ecosystems to drive
innovations, despite the necessity to
share IP with rivals
There is no uniform model to link
technological innovation and the
development of IP to the
standardization these innovations
IPR policies of various SDOs are nonuniform, creating confusion in the ICT
industry over technology standards
development and adoption

Key determinants of the decision to
participate in organizations that
define technology standards
Holistic framework through which
ICT firms assess various perspectives
before joining standards
organizations
Risk mitigation and investment
recoupment considerations in the
decision to join standardization
effort

Research Objective
There are no extant decision support models or frameworks to help technology

managers in assessing the relevant criteria in the decision to join or not join a
technology standardization effort. For instance, what factors are relevant? How should
these factors be prioritized and weighted in the decision? Are there different sets of
factors depending on the technology, the standards organization, the market segment,
and other such considerations? Is there a holistic framework by which managers in ICT
firms can assess competing perspectives and other germane considerations in such a
decision? How do these managers quantify benefits and mitigate risks? Most technology
managers operate with insufficient information and analysis in this regard.
In addition, technology managers have no deterministic way to judge whether a
product-focused or royalty-focused strategy will better serve the firm in harvesting
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value from its IP portfolio. Nor are there any studies to show whether an ex ante or ex
post arrangement serves as the optimum IPR policy for a standards organization. In fact,
the esoteric and variant nature of IPR contracts in different SDOs is flaccid in the view of
most technology managers.
Thus, the paramount objective of this research is to develop and validate a
model to assist technology managers in deciding whether or not to participate in the
standardization of their innovative technologies, taking into account the important
decision criteria with a diligent appraisal of all available alternatives and outcomes.
This research framework is depicted in Figure 4 with the gaps previously outlined
in Table 7 above:

Figure 4 - Research framework.
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3.3

Perspectives Derived From the Literature
Ab initio, four distinct perspectives emerge from the review of the academic

literature on technology standardization. These perspectives are depicted in Figure 5:

Figure 5 - Perspectives gleaned from the academic literature.
The application of multiple perspectives in managerial decision-making is well
established in academia.208 Thus, the derivation of the Economic-StrategicOrganizational-Legal (ESOL) perspectives is the initial unique contribution from my
research and will be referenced as the ESOL framework throughout this study.

3.4

Research Question
The dissimilarity of IPR regimes in SDOs and the dependence of ICT products on a

growing number of technology standards are formidable challenges faced by firms
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whose products contain inventions couched in numerous technologies that span
multiple standards. In such an environment, how should a firm evaluate its IP portfolio
to determine whether or not to participate in the development and diffusion of
technology standards? How does a firm know that it has arrived at optimal licensing
terms for harvesting maximum value from its IP portfolio? What is the strategic
framework that informs a firm’s IPR policies? What are the impacts of the firm’s IPR
policies on investments in innovation? I intend to research these and related questions.
To explore this space, the following question is germane: How does a firm decide
whether or not to participate in standards development, and thereby to commit its IP
portfolio to licensing obligations? There are a number of related questions that flow
from this query. For example, how is an IP portfolio valued and monetized? In other
words, how much is a given piece of IP worth and how is that value determined?
My research question constitutes a qualitative assessment of the factors deemed
essential within a strategic decision-support framework.
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Chapter 4:

Research Methodology

From the literature-based gap analysis above, it is clear that ICT firms are faced
with formidable decisions related to the management of innovations and the
standardization of technologies such as whether the firm should participate in the
definition or adoption of a technology standard by joining a SDO. Invariably such
decisions are made in the face of imperfect information and uncertainties, and are
impacted by a variety of criteria that require precise and up-to-date analysis as well as
astute managerial experience and judgment.

4.1

Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)
Complex managerial decisions have many interrelated components. These form

a network of interacting factors that necessitate the synthesis of diverse sets of data
and information. In such a context, it becomes difficult to differentiate causes and
effects and the decision is often taken in the face of risks and uncertainties.209 The
central question addressed by this study pertains to strategic decision making in a
complex, multivariate environment with uncertainty and risk. There are many methods
that use numeric techniques to differentiate and distinguish among a discrete set of
alternatives and outcomes.210 211 212 Usually, this is done through the assessment of the
impact of various interacting criteria in the presence of several decision choices.
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one methodology used by decision
analysts and managers in multi-criteria decisions. It has been used extensively for over
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30 years in a variety of managerial decision-making applications and has been found to
be robust, reliable and flexible.213 214 215
The premise behind the AHP is simple: a decision maker is faced with a number
of alternatives and a set of criteria by which to assess each alternative to achieve a
desired objective.216 AHP disaggregates a decision into a hierarchy and enables the use
of ratio scales in mathematically-grounded structures to assess the decision.217 The
outcome with the highest aggregated weight is evaluated for optimality.
AHP provides a structured approach for making decisions based on scores and
weights from a multicriteria scoring model. It incorporates the three principles inherent
in problem solving: decomposition, comparative judgments and synthesis of
priorities.218 AHP hierarchically decomposes the decision such that the factors or criteria
can be compared in a pairwise manner against all possible outcomes. In many cases,
experts provide the necessary matrices of comparison data, which are then
mathematically transformed into a normalized eigenvector of weights associated with
each element in the comparison matrix.219
AHP is a consistent, intuitive and time-tested framework for formulating and
analyzing multicriteria decisions and within many contexts and applications.220 221 222 For
this research, the model and dataset availability are well aligned with the disaggregation
of the decision framework and the quantification of expert judgments, respectively.
Thus AHP is a suitable research methodology in this case. A disadvantage to the AHP
methodology is its reliance on human choice and judgments that can be prone to
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reversals and inconsistencies, especially when experts are asked to re-evaluate their
preferences after the initial elicitation of pairwise data.223 There is a substantial body of
research by many scholars, including Tversky, Kahneman and others, that delves into
the issue of preference reversal.224 225 226 Preference reversal will not be an issue in this
research as the experts will not be asked to reconsider their original elicitations.
Other quantitative methodologies include descriptive statistics, Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), other mathematical programming techniques such as
integer linear or integer non-linear, fuzzy set theory and a number of other
methodologies.227 228 229 230 231 232 DEA is primarily used to assess the relative efficiency
of an associated set of Decision Making Units (DMUs). Mathematical programming is
used extensively in modeling and solving a variety of optimization problems. Fuzzy set
theory is an extension of set theory that is used chiefly to assess members of a set.
Some scholars combine multiple methodologies. For example, AHP and DEA can be
combined in decision support frameworks to overcome information loss or model
insensitivities.233 234 235 236 237 In this study, I intend to use AHP alone since information
loss will not be an issue. The resultant model will be rigorously analyzed for consistency.

4.2

Model Definition
AHP requires the setting of a goal and the enumeration of the alternative ways

to achieve that goal. The criteria and sub-criteria for the decision are identified. The
decision variables are arranged in a hierarchy and the priorities of each alternative are
determined with respect to the decision criteria and all sub-criteria within the hierarchy.
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The hierarchy is comprised of the priority matrix linking each decision criterion
to the goal as well as the priority matrix linking each decision criterion to each
alternative outcome.238 Data is derived from a variety of sources including data bases,
expert opinions, literature reviews, and so on. After the data computation has passed
checks for transitivity and consistency, global weights are assigned to each alternative to
determine its rank in the decision hierarchy.
The AHP scoring model is based on the intensity of importance and ranges
between 1 and 9, with 1 indicating that both options have equal importance, and 9
signifying that one option is extremely more important than the other.239
A derivative of AHP called the Hierarchical Decision Modeling (HDM) is employed
for this study in which the constant-sum method of spreading 100 points in the pairwise
comparison comprises the main difference with the AHP scoring scale. The relative
weight assignments of the compared elements derived through the HDM computation
algorithm is similar to the priority vector of the principal eigenvalues in AHP. Also, HDM
mitigates for disagreements and inconsistencies, thus removing one of the known issues
with AHP-based methods termed Condition of Order Preservation (COP).240
The AHP steps are followed sequentially as depicted in Table 8 below:241
Table 8 – AHP steps and actions.
Step
AHP Step 0
AHP Step 1
AHP Step 2
AHP Step 3
AHP Step 4

Action
Disaggregate the problem and build a hierarchy of the decision objective, criteria,
alternatives and other factors germane to the decision
Create pairwise comparison matrices for each decision alternative per criterion
Normalize the matrices of pairwise comparison data
Compute the consistency index, ratio, eigenvector and related statistics
Compute weighted average scores for each decision alternative
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Chapter 5:

Research Design

A complex managerial decision process typically involves the identification of a
desired objective, the implementation of situational analyses, and the evaluation of
potential outcomes until one of the available alternatives is adopted and put into action.
Sometimes, the chosen course of action is further analyzed for sensitivity to
perturbation and unexpected effects to ensure that the optimum decision has been
taken, and if not for corrective actions to be evaluated. The research to address this
question will be conducted according to the plan outlined below.

5.1

Research Plan
The research plan is defined in nine serial, incremental steps shown in Figure 6:

Figure 6 - Research plan.
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These steps are further described in Table 9 below:
Table 9 - Research activities.
Step
1-2
3-5
6
7

8

9

Activity
After the development of a preliminary list of decision criteria derived from the literature,
the initial AHP model shall be reviewed for completeness with a panel of experts in the
field of technology standards
The updates from the reviews with the panel of experts shall be applied to the model and
once again validated by the panel for agreement and corroboration
The final, validated model shall be quantified with pairwise comparison data, also supplied
by panels of experts
The case of an extant technology standard shall be applied to the model as a final check for
applicability of the general model to a specific case
The results shall be analyzed for consistency and sensitivity to gauge the strength and
robustness of the model. The software application to carry out the computation of weights
from the pairwise data shall be provided by the Engineering and Technology Management
department at Portland State University
Related managerial implications, limitations of the study and a research agenda for future
scholars shall be proposed to round out the findings

The objective is to standardize a technology which implies participation in the
relevant SDO. The preliminary framework contains ten decision criteria and four
decision alternatives. The criteria are consistent with the literature along the ESOL
perspectives identified in the literature review section. These criteria shall be validated
with the panel of experts as described above and other layers of the hierarchy shall be
developed in the same manner.
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Figure 7 below depicts the mapping of the research perspectives to the criteria:

Figure 7 - Mapping of ESOL perspectives to decision criteria.
The various criteria are defined below as they map to the ESOL perspectives.
Economic
Criteria that pertain to costs inherent in technology standards development and
the return on that investment (ROI) are mapped to the economic perspective.
Cost is a measure of the long-term expenditures and financial outlays that would
be committed by the ICT firm in its pursuit of technology standards. Since the
development and on-going maintenance of technology standards can span multiple
years, the ICT firm needs to adopt a long-term horizon relative to this criterion. Cost is
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comprehensive of R&D, labor, capital and any other business expenditures in this
context.
ROI is a measure of benefits that accrue to the ICT firm in its pursuit of standards
activities. It can comprehend tangible and intangible benefits, all of which must be
converted to quantitative metrics for uniform assessment. The valuation of IP portfolio
is germane to this criterion since it provides added precision to the assessment of ROI.
Strategic
Criteria that pertain to the alignment of the technology standards development
activity relative to the corporate strategy, the scope of the technology standards
development, industry ecosystem interactions and network externalities as well as the
IP appropriability regime are mapped to the strategic perspective.
The offensive-oriented firm will seek to join standards activities and contribute
its IP for incorporation into multiple technology standards for the express purpose of
exploiting the opportunity to collect rents and royalties from the licensing of its
intellectual assets. The defensive-oriented firm will join standards development
activities for the express purpose of obtaining licenses for the IP that it would be
integrating into its standards-based products, and to protect itself from inadvertent
infringement of said intellectual assets.
The scope of the standards development activity pertains to corporate strategy
as it can include or exclude portions of a firm’s IP portfolio with its attendant
implications.
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Network externalities can be deemed strategic in that they can expose the ICT
firm to an ecosystem of partners, customers and complementors that could greatly
enhance the function and value of its standards-based offerings.
The appropriability regime in this regard pertains to the degree to which IP
licensing is available for appropriation by the ICT firm. This concept is discussed in the
literature and is germane to a decision-support framework.
Organizational
Criteria that pertain to the enrollment policy and the membership range, or
depth and breadth, of the organization, as well as the geographical coverage of the
standards development organization are mapped to the organizational perspective.
The enrollment policy of the SDO can take many forms with implications to the
management of the organization itself as well as the strategy of the ICT firm interested
in joining the organization. It can be a completely open organization, a closed
organization or somewhere in between these polar opposites where a firm could be
invited to join based on certain desirability factors or ecosystem dependencies.
SDOs attract a range of members. This can include commercial firms,
government institutions, educational establishments, individuals and so on. This
membership range has implications to the management of the organization itself as well
as the strategy of the ICT firm interested in joining the organization.
Legal
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Criteria that pertain to the IPR licensing policy and the IP disclosure
requirements of the SDO are mapped to the legal perspective.
The IPR policy of the standards organization has a direct bearing on the decision
of the firm to join a standards effort. IPR policy is explained in depth elsewhere in this
paper. Essentially, the standards organizations can obligate the IP owner to license its IP
free of royalties or it may not impose any such onus, thus enabling the firm to charge
rents on its IP if it chose to do so. Many ICT firms have shown a distinct preference for a
RAND IPR policy where royalties are not precluded.
Rules governing IP disclosure vary from one organization to the next. This can be
important since knowledge of IP reading on the technology standard can greatly
influence the decision of the ICT firm in its pursuit of technology standardization. In
general, IP disclosure can be completely passive and voluntary or actively required.
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Having defined the decision criteria, the preliminary hierarchical construct for
my research question is shown in Figure 8 below:

Figure 8 – Preliminary hierarchy of the decision model.
Four decision outcomes are identified. The first outcome (O1) is to join and
strongly participate in, influence and drive the development of the standard. The second
outcome (O2) is to join but to not actively participate and simply monitor the progress of
the standards development as necessary. The third outcome (O3) is to join but only after
exclusionary carve-out of certain intellectual assets have been negotiated from licensing
obligations to protect the firm from committing the portion(s) of its portfolio that it
deems to be too valuable to make available. The fourth outcome (O4) is to not join the
standards development activity. Note that in the first two alternatives, the firm may be
committing the relevant portions of its IP portfolio to licensing obligations. These

- 80 -

decision alternatives were derived through interviews of IP attorneys at various ICT and
law firms familiar with technology standardization.

5.2

Case Selection
The proposed decision-support framework shall be corroborated with an extant

technology standard. This will confirm the generalizability of the proposed decision
model. The validity of the model is confirmed when the general and case-specific
applications are deemed to be consistent. The case in question is that of the Universal
Serial Bus (USB).
5.2.1 Universal Serial Bus (USB)
In the early 1990s peripheral devices that connected to a Personal Computer
(PC) such as scanners, printers, personal digital assistants, cameras and so on, each had
their own complicated installation procedure. In fact, many such connections required
the complete shutdown of the system, manual installation of the hardware and
requisite software, and a restart of the entire system followed by post-installation
adjustments, before a simple data transfer could take place between the PC and the
peripheral device such as a printer.
With the growing popularity of the PC as a desktop printing and digital
communications platform and the ever-increasing demand for connectivity with the
burgeoning worldwide network of PCs connected to the Internet, conditions were ripe
for a more efficient and convenient method to move data on or off devices without the
hardship and the inefficient interruptions of the PC shutdown and reboot sequence.242
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In recognizing this problem, Intel Corporation contributed technology from its
research facilities to enable the low-cost and high-speed connectivity of peripheral
devices to the PC platform with easy, plug-and-play simplicity. Intel spearheaded the
formation of a group of influential industry leaders in developing an industry
specification with royalty-free IP licensing made available to all adopters of the
technology. This technology was dubbed the Universal Serial Bus (USB) and architected
for the movement and storage of digital information between PCs and other digital
devices through a cable. Intel led the integration of this technology in its chipset
products and hosted many interoperability events to facilitate the adoption of the
technology by other members of the USB ecosystem. The USB Implementers Forum
(USB-IF) was formed in 1995 and later incorporated as an industry standards
organization to support and accelerate the market adoption of USB-compliant products.
Today, USB is a household name and is the preferred connectivity standard for
nearly all major electronic and personal computing devices worldwide. The USB
standard has displaced older and competing means of connectivity such as the parallel
port or the 1394 (also known as FireWire) technology. In 2007, the Maximum PC
magazine named USB the premier PC technology innovation of all time!243 By 2018, it is
estimated that USB device shipments will exceed five billion units.244
The selection of USB is justified given my considerable a posteriori acquaintance
with this technology, access to knowledgeable experts, and the facile collection of
reliable data. I collected data from technology managers involved in standards
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development to analyze the relative priority of the various factors that were identified
as important to the development of USB technology. Six factors—cost, usability,
compatibility, synergy, longevity, leadership—were identified by these managers and
ranked for importance to the decision to standardize USB. The results of the pairwise
comparison computation are shown in Table 10 below:
Table 10 - Factors influencing USB standardization (Neshati, 2009).
Statistics
Max
Min
Mean
Std. Dev.
Rank

Cost
0.21
0.09
0.16
0.04
4 (Tie)

Usability
0.24
0.14
0.19
0.03
2

Compatibility
0.26
0.17
0.20
0.03
1

Synergy
0.19
0.13
0.17
0.02
3

Longevity
0.23
0.10
0.16
0.04
4 (Tie)

Leadership
0.15
0.08
0.12
0.02
6

The respondents rated compatibility with existing standards and infrastructures
as the highest priority consideration in the development of USB, followed closely by
functionality and usability as well as strategic synergy with business objectives. Contrary
to expectations, cost of development and longevity of the standard were rated lower,
tied for fourth place in the rankings, with leadership opportunities for the firm bringing
up the rear. The key learning from this study highlights the importance of continuity,
through generational compatibility, when developing a technology standard like USB.

5.3

Validating the Model
The proposed model will be verified for construct, content and criterion validity.

Construct validity pertains to the relationship between various measurable metrics
within a model and verifies that the proposed model construction is relevant to the
research at hand. Content validity pertains to the scope and comprehensiveness of the
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measurable metrics within a model and verifies that the proposed model content
provides for sufficient research depth and breadth. Criterion validity pertains to the
instrumentality and relevance of the various decision criteria and sub-criteria that
appear in the model. This is shown in Table 11 below:
Table 11 - Model validation.
Validation Type
Construct
Content
Criterion

Description
The degree to which theoretical concepts and the structure of the model
conform to praxis and/or expectations of the experts
The degree to which the inclusion of individual model elements relate to praxis
and/or expectations of the experts
The degree of the effectiveness of the model in prioritizing current/future
considerations and/or expectations of the experts

Validation of the model construct and content is accomplished through
interviews and feedback received from Panel 1. This validation is performed after the
development of the preliminary model using instrument I.3 (Model Development
Instrument) shown below. Validation of the model criteria is accomplished through
interviews and feedback received from Panels 2a and 2b. This validation is performed
after the development of the updated model using instrument I.4 (Model Validation
Instrument) shown below. These validation steps are performed prior to the
compilation of the judgment quantifications from the experts and the post facto model
analysis.
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Furthermore, two important scores, Inconsistency and Disagreement, are used
to vet the model as described below and shown in Table 12:
Table 12 - Inconsistencies and disagreements in pairwise comparisons.
Inconsistency
Measures consistency in the judgment of an
individual expert (member of a panel)
By convention, tolerance threshold is 10%
𝑛

𝑛!

𝑖=1

𝑗=1

Disagreement
Measures agreement among judgment results of
the group (a panel of experts)
By convention, tolerance threshold is 10%
𝑚

𝑛

1
∑ ∑(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗 )2
√
𝑛. 𝑚

1
1
∑ √∑(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗 )2
𝑛
𝑛!

𝑗=1 𝑖=1

Despite inconsistencies and disagreements in judgment quantification, scholars
have shown that the principal eigenvector is a reliable measure for differentiating ranks
of the matrix elements provided that the threshold is less than or equal to the 10%
benchmark.245 246 The sections below describe mitigation methods for inconsistencies
and disagreements.
5.3.1 Inconsistency
As judgment quantification relies on the knowledge of experts, putatively, data
from human subjects may be inconsistent at times. Inconsistency is measured as the
variance in the values of each orientation relative to the mean.247 Consider that in
pairwise comparisons, for n decision elements n! orientations exist, such as abc, acb,
bac, bca and so on, representing the various comparison matrices. These orientations
may have slight variance in the relative values of the elements in the presence of
judgment inconsistency.
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A score of 0 implies perfect consistency by the expert. By convention, the
tolerance threshold for inconsistency is set at 10% (0.1).
In this analysis, discordant judgment data will be removed from consideration. In
effect, data from an inconsistent expert will not be used in the final quantified model.
5.3.2 Disagreement
In judgment quantification it is possible for panelists to disagree with each other
in their pairwise assessments of the same pair of elements. Given m experts and n
decision elements, disagreement is computed as the variance in the value of the mean
value assigned by the jth expert to the ith element relative to the group.248
A score of 0 implies perfect agreement among the panelists. By convention, the
tolerance threshold for disagreement is set at 10% (0.1).
In this analysis, where there is significant disagreement among the panelists the
assessments of the experts will be further reviewed and, if necessary, the panels will be
reconstituted with experts along similar levels of expertise or job functions to mitigate
the group disagreement.

5.4

Data Collection
Data for this study is primarily supplied by panels of experts immersed in

technology standardization. This expert panel methodology is commonly used in
qualitative research spanning several disciplines, including business, medicine, social
sciences and other fields of scholarly enquiry as demonstrated by Mervis (1993), Smith
and Ford (1993), Kiernan (1994), Strickland and Berman (1995), and others.249 250 251 252
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5.4.1 Data Collection Instruments
Table 13 describes the various data collection instruments used in this research:
Table 13 - Data collection instruments.
Phase
0

Instrument
Model
Development
(I.1 and I.2)

Purpose

1

Model
Validation
(I.3)

Validate the updated
model for construct,
content and criteria,
and generate the
final model

2

Model
Quantification
– Perspectives
(I.4)
Model
Quantification
– Criteria
(I.5)
Model
Quantification
– Outcomes
(I.6)

3

4

Review the
preliminary model
and provide feedback
on additional
Perspectives and
Criteria

Quantify the model
at the Perspectives
layer of the hierarchy
Quantify the model
at the Criteria layer
of the hierarchy
Quantify the model
at the Outcomes
layer of the hierarchy

Data Collected
Broad spectrum of
responses on model
ingredients and numerous
suggestions for the
inclusion of additional
Criteria and one new
Perspective
Binary checklist expressing
experts’ [dis]agreements
w/ inclusion of model
elements from Phase 1
PCM data for Perspectives
when judged against the
Objective layer (i.e. root)
of the hierarchy
PCM data for Criteria
when judged against the
Perspectives layer of the
hierarchy
PCM data for Outcomes
when judged against the
Criteria layer of the
hierarchy (each criterion)

Method
Open-ended questions
to elicit a wide range of
responses on the
preliminary model and
leeway to edit the
model
Computation of µ for
each element and
elimination of elements
w/ ˂ 67% (i.e. 2/3
majority)
Constant sum, w/ 10%
threshold for
Inconsistency and
Disagreement
Constant sum, w/ 10%
threshold for
Inconsistency and
Disagreement
Constant sum, w/ 10%
threshold for
Inconsistency and
Disagreement

All of these instruments are produced in Appendix A. All panelists were required
to read and acknowledge instruments I.1 (Subject Recruitment), and I.2 (Informed
Consent).
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5.4.2 Expert Panels
As shown in Table 14, five panels of experts are used to collect data for analysis:
Table 14 - Expert panel composition.
Panel
Panel 1
Panel 2a
Panel 2b
Panel 3a
Panel 3b

Compositio
n
36 experts
29 experts
15 experts
10 experts
7 experts

E:S:O:L Breakdown

Function

10:10:9:7
9:9:6:5
2:6:3:4
2:3:1:4
1:1:1:4

Review preliminary model, update & validate the model
Quantify the Perspectives & Criteria for the General case
Quantify the Perspectives & Criteria for the USB case
Quantify the Outcomes for the General case
Quantify the Outcomes for the USB case

The panels are representative of several areas of expertise in the ICT industry
such as technology managers, corporate executives with decision-making authority in
matters related to technology standardization, engineers with substantial experience in
SDO participation, and IP attorneys with expertise in patent and antitrust law, SDO
incorporation and related legal issues. Panelists are drawn from various ICT firms
representing diverse job functions to ensure balanced input in the dataset as well as
from a variety of sources, including silicon component manufacturers, integrated
systems developers, software vendors, measurement analysis tools providers, and so
on. Figure 9 below depicts the panel functions:
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Figure 9 - Panels of experts and their functions.
Panelists are selected using these constraints to ensure balanced representation:


Proven expertise in technology standardization in the ICT industry



Broad representation comprising hardware, software and integrated systems



Knowledge of other panel participants to compensate for individual bias



Absence of conflict between panel participants to avoid skewed data



Avoidance of overly passive and overly active panelists to ensure fair participation
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The distribution of the participating ICT firms, the job functions of the panelists
mapped to the ESOL perspectives and their geographical spread is depicted in Table 15:
Table 15 - Expert panel distribution.
Company
IBM
TI
Intel
Intel
Toshiba
Intel
Intel
TI
Intel
Intel
Intel
AMD
Cadence
Marvell
Intel
VTM
Intel
Broadcom
NEC/Renases
HP
Intel
Intel
VTM
Agilent
Qualcomm
Intel
Qualcomm
Synopsys
Intel
Intel
SWW
Dell
VTM
Microsoft
MM
KS
TOTAL

Manager (E)
X

Job Function
Executive (S)
Engineer (O)

Attorney (L)

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

10

10

9
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X
X
7

Geography
USA
USA
USA
USA
EU
USA
USA
EU
USA
USA
USA
Canada
China
EU
USA
USA
USA
Vietnam
Japan
USA
USA
USA
USA
EU
India
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
ME
USA
USA

The four job functions, Manager, Executive, Engineer and Attorney, are mapped
directly to the ESOL perspective, respectively. In this context, a manager is any person
with people or project management responsibilities and thus closer to the economic
aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization. An executive is any
person with leadership responsibilities and thus closer to the strategic aspects of the
decision to participate in technology standardization. An engineer is any person with
technology innovation and development responsibilities and thus closer to the
organizational aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization. And,
finally, an attorney is any person with advice and council responsibilities and thus closer
to the legal aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization.
In obtaining PCM data for the assessment of criteria within each of the ESOL
perspectives, panelists data will be used in the following manner: data from managers
will be used to assess the economic criteria, data from executives will be used to assess
the strategic criteria, data from engineers will be used to assess the organizational
criteria, and data from attorneys will be used to assess the legal criteria. In this way, any
bias that inadvertently may creep in to the judgment quantifications will be avoided as a
result of a panelist providing data in an area not considered to be their primary job.
While the panelists are drawn chiefly from ICT firms based in the US (72%), there
are many panelists from other regions such as the EU (11%), the Asia-Pacific region (8%),
and other geographies. Semiconductor manufacturers (47%) and system integrators
(14%) comprise the majority of the panelists, but there are significant participants from
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the services industries, including the legal profession (19%) and SDO administration
firms (8%). From an ESOL perspective, the panelists are fairly evenly distributed.
The geographical, business and ESOL perspective are shown in Figure 10:

Figure 10 - Expert panel breakdowns.
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5.4.3 Model Progression Process
The model progression followed the process as shown in Figure 11 below:

Figure 11 - Model progression steps.
Panel 1 reviewed the preliminary model, provided updates and validated the
final model. This is shown as steps 1-4 above. Panels 2a and 2b provided judgment data
to quantify the perspectives and criteria layers of the hierarchy, for the General and USB
models respectively. Panels 3a and 3b provided judgment data to quantify the outcomes
layer of the hierarchy, for the General and USB models respectively. These are shown as
steps 5-6 above. The complete model development process is documented in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 6:

Model Development and Results

From a thoroughgoing review of the academic literature, I have identified four
perspectives on technology standardization relevant to ICT firms. These perspectives
are: Economic, Strategic, Organizational and Legal (ESOL). Each of the perspectives are
cogently explained and integrated into the AHP model. The cataloging of these
perspectives is the first in a series of results from my research.
The preliminary model was sent to the panel of experts who were asked to
review and to suggest improvements to it. The updated model with the integration of
input from all panelists was sent back to the experts once again and this time they were
asked to validate the various elements of the model. The resulting validated model was
quantified at all levels of the hierarchy by different panels of experts for the General
case and for the chosen USB case application. Finally, the General and the USB models
were contrasted and analyzed for congruency, consistency among panelists and for
sensitivity to arbitrary change.
These outcomes are explained in greater detail below.
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6.1

Model Development
In this phase of research, experts on Panel 1 were asked to complete I.3 (Model

Development instrument). The updated model is shown in Figure 12:

Figure 12 - Updated model.
Relative to the preliminary model, this version contains 1 new perspective and
25 new decision criteria. None of the input from the panelists was ignored or omitted
and thus the revised model is comprehensive of all input.
The new perspective was identified as environmental/social, which is a
perspective that is not pervasive in the extant academic literature. Ipso facto, this could
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be due to the recent significance of the role of technology standardization as an
environmental or societal phenomenon.
Since this updated model was a compilation of blind input by all panelists, it
needed to be validated by the group as a whole as described in the following section.

6.2

Model Validation
In this phase of research, all experts on Panel 1 were asked to complete I.4

(Model Validation instrument). The validation data used to finalize the model is shown
in Table 16 below:
Table 16 - Model validation data.
Perspectives
Economic
Strategic
Organizational
Legal
Environmental
Economic Criteria
Market Expansion
Opportunity Cost
R&D Savings
IP Revenue
TTM Incentives
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI
Intangible ROI
Strategic Criteria
Enabling Rivals
Growing Expertise
Developing Adjacency
Alternative Technologies
Trends/Disruptions
Technology Scope
Appropriability
Network Externality
Product Alignment
Organizational Criteria
Governance

Agree
28
29
27
29
19
Agree
27
26
23
23
20
24
23
23
26
Agree
17
28
20
19
26
20
27
28
27
Agree
28
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Disagree
1
0
2
0
19
Disagree
2
3
6
6
9
5
6
6
3
Disagree
12
1
9
10
3
9
2
1
2
Disagree
1

%
97
100
93
100
66
%
93
90
79
79
69
83
79
79
90
%
59
97
69
66
90
69
93
97
93
%
97

Funding
Certification Program
Rules/Procedures
Efficiency
Technical/Marketing Focus
Member Contribution
Partnerships
Enrollment Policy
Membership Depth
Legal Criteria
Incorporation
Tax Status
Antitrust Enforcement
IP Disclosure Requirement
IPR Licensing Policy
Environmental Criteria
Government Regulation
Technology Diffusion

24
29
27
27
28
28
27
23
20
Agree
26
15
25
27
28
Agree
22
24

5
0
2
2
1
1
2
6
9
Disagree
3
14
4
2
1
Disagree
7
5

83
100
93
93
97
97
93
79
69
%
90
52
86
93
97
%
76
83

All elements that did not garner the consent of a simple majority of the panelists
(2/3 or approximately 67% agreement) were eliminated from further consideration. The
resultant model is shown in Figure 13 below:
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Figure 13 - Final, validated model.
The final, validated model is comprised of the 4 ESOL perspectives, 28 criteria
and 4 outcomes.
The definitions of the decision criteria are depicted in Table 17:
Table 17 – Definition of decision criteria.
Perspective

Criterion

Abbr.

Market Expansion

ME

Opportunity Cost

OC

R&D Savings

RD

IP Revenue

IR

Economic
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Definition
Access to new markets and opportunity
to expand standards-based products to
adjacent markets
Financial assets that could be used for
activities other than technology
standardization
Savings in R&D investments arising from
access to contributed technologies by
other firms in SDOs
Revenues generated as a result of the
licensing of intellectual assets to other
members of the SDO/industry

Strategic

Cost of Absence

CA

Cost of Presence

CP

Tangible ROI/Recoupment

TR

Grow Expertise

GE

Trends & Disruptions

TD

Appropriability

AP

Network Externality

NE

Product Alignment

PA

Diffusion of Technology

DT

Intangible ROI/Leadership

IR

Governance

GO

Funding

FU

Certification Program

CP

Rules & Procedures

RP

Operational Efficiency

OE

Technical/Marketing Focus

FO

Organizational
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Total estimated cost of missing out on
standardization over the life of the
technology
Total estimated cost of participating in
standardization over the life of the
technology
Total estimated return or benefit from
the investment in standardization over
the life of the technology
Growth of hitherto unavailable technical
expertise from participation in
standardization
Ability to detect emerging trends and
technological disruptions from
participation in SDOs
License availability for the critical IP for
interoperable product development and
ease of technology adoption
Exposure to networks and ecosystem of
customers, complementors and
competitors
Alignment of product plans and
roadmaps to the emerging technology
standard
Ability to broadly diffuse technologies to
gain advantage through familiarity and
dependencies on IP portfolio
Non-financial returns on investment such
as industry leadership, prestige and other
visible forms of status
Accountable leadership and strong
adherence to democratic governance for
representative administration of the SDO
Adequate funding and income generation
by the SDO for long-term operation and
stability
Ability of the SDO to administer programs
to test conformance to the specification
to ensure interoperable implementations
Availability and adherence to fair,
transparent and uniformly applied sets of
rules and procedures
Overall efficiency of the SDO, its speed of
execution, timely promotion of standards
and other considerations
Primary focus of the SDO –
technical/technology development,
marketing or other

Legal

Member Contributions

MC

Partnerships

PA

Enrollment Policies

EP

Incorporation

IN

Antitrust Enforcement

AN

IP Disclosure Requirements

ID

IPR Licensing

IL

Government Regulations

GR

- 100 -

Ability of SDO members to contribute
technologies during the
definition/development of standards
Ability and experience of the SDO in
forming partnerships with other SDOs to
promote standards
Flexibility of the SDO in accepting new
members to participate in standards
development
Legal status of the SDO as a recognized
for-profit or non-profit entity with and
elected Board of Directors and Officers
Adherence of the SDO to antitrust
monitoring and timely action when
violations are detected
IP disclosure requirements and related
policies of the SDO that will identify
essential patents reading on the standard
IP license availability consistent with the
IPR policies of the SDO on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms
Government mandated regulations that
bear on the work product of the SDO
such as restrictions or other limitations

6.3

Model Quantification
In this phase of research, the model is scored with the judgment of the experts

using the equation shown in Figure 14:

Figure 14 - Aggregate score equation and symbol definition.
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The experts on Panels 2a and 3a were asked to complete I.5 (Model
Quantification Instrument – Criteria). The result is shown in Figure 15 below:

Figure 15 - Quantified model (General).
The experts rated the strategic perspective highest among the 4 ESOL
perspectives with a score of 38% and rated the organizational perspective lowest with a
score of only 9%.
Among the criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated highest by the experts under
the strategic perspective.
The decision outcome preferred by the experts is O1 with a score of 39% with O4
rated lowest at 14%.
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The experts on Panels 3a and 3b were asked to complete I.6 (Model
Quantification Instrument – Outcomes). The result is shown in Figure 16 below:

Figure 16 - Quantified model (USB).
In the case of the USB model too the experts rated the strategic perspective
highest among the 4 ESOL perspectives with a score of 44% and rated the organizational
perspective lowest with a score of only 9%. This is consistent with the General model.
Among the criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated highest by the experts,
which is consistent with the General model.
The decision outcome preferred by the experts is O1 with a score of 36% with O4
rated lowest at 14%. This, too, is consistent with the results obtained in the General
model.
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Chapter 7:

Analysis of Results

As mentioned, the use of expert judgments involves subjectivity among the input
sources. To ensure an effective use of subjective data in a quantitative decision model,
the data must be checked for inconsistencies, disagreements and sensitivities.
A simple method to check for sensitivity of decision alternatives with respect to
the criteria follows a “what-if” scenario wherein weight assignments are incrementally
altered one at a time while holding all others constant, to determine if that incremental
change induces a different outcome or result.253 These perturbations are performed
systematically over the entire matrix of criteria and alternatives. Where sensitivities are
found to alter the initial model result, further analysis can be performed to determine
the relationship and dependence of the factors involved in the change.
In my analysis I will systematically vary the weights of perspective and criteria
nodes to assess the sensitivity and robustness of the model.

7.1

Model Scores
In reviewing the results for both the General and USB models there are some

inconsistencies that need to be mitigated but the disagreement scores are generally
below the expected threshold. These results are discussed below.
7.1.1 Inconsistency Scores
Most of the experts’ data was consistent but there were some experts that
exhibited inconsistencies. Table 18 below depicts the expert inconsistency scores:
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Table 18 - Inconsistency scores for all panels.
Phase
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4

Panel
2a
2b
2b
2a
2a
2a
2a
2a
2a
2b
2a
3b
3b

Panelist
Expert02
Expert02
Expert03
Expert15
Expert27
Expert15
Expert16
Expert27
Expert29
Expert03
Expert14
Expert05
Expert06

Model
General
USB
USB
General
General
General
General
General
General
USB
General
USB
USB

Inconsistency
0.16
0.18
0.22
0.14
0.16
0.24
0.17
0.11
0.14
0.17
0.15
0.18
0.15

The data from these inconsistent experts were removed from both the General
and USB models which caused slight modifications to the weight computations of the
perspectives, criteria and outcomes elements at each layer of the model hierarchy.
None of these changes, however, had any material impact on the priority or ranking of
the various elements, nor did they have any impact on the decision outcome. The
removal of inconsistent data from the model improves its overall robustness and
increases confidence in the derived results.
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The revised side-by-side scores for both the General and USB models are shown
in Figure 17 below, with the numbers on the right (in blue color) representing the
General model and the numbers on the left (in red color) representing the USB model:

Figure 17 - Final model scores without inconsistencies.
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7.1.2 Disagreement Scores
Table 19 below shows the panel disagreement scores:
Table 19 - Disagreement scores for all panels.
Hierarchy Layer
Perspectives
Criteria – Economic
Criteria – Strategic
Criteria – Organizational
Criteria - Legal
Outcomes

Model

Disagreement

General

0.12

USB
General
USB
General
USB
General
USB
General
USB
General
USB

0.04
0.09
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.08
0.07
0.09
0.10

Explanation
Expert13 (SW engineer) and Expert25
(IP attorney) disagree
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
Below threshold
At threshold

Except for one score noted above, the disagreement scores do not pose a
problem as they are all at or below the accepted threshold. The exception in this case is
not significant since the score is fairly low and the reason for the disagreement can be
fathomed from a closer look at the expert’s job functions and thus their varying
experiences and priorities. Specifically, Expert13, a software engineer, and Expert25, an
attorney, provided data that were significantly at odds with that from the other experts.
These disagreements are expected when the panel is sufficiently large and diverse. A
disagreement score of 0.12, however, although above the acceptable threshold of 0.10,
is not sufficiently large to have a material impact on the overall quality of the results.
7.1.3 Key Scores and Findings Summarized
From the final model scores shown in Figure 17 above, it is clear that:
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1. Both models highlight strategy as the primary perspective. Effectively, technology
standardization is a strategic decision for most ICT firms.
2. Both models confirm Market Expansion (ME) as the most important economic factor
in pursuing technology standards. In other words, ICT firms view standardization as
an enabler to grow their availability and access to core and adjacent markets.
3. Both models confirm Product Alignment (PA) as the most important strategic factor
in pursuing technology standards. This is evidence that ICT firms are interested to
align their product roadmaps with the content and entry of technology standards.
4. Both models confirm IPR Licensing (IL) as the most important legal factor in pursuing
technology standards. The availability of licenses and the IPR policies of the SDO
rank high for most ICT firms.
5. Both models point to the similar decision outcome: O1. In effect, ICT firms prefer to
join the SDO in question and drive the standard effort to reap the various benefits
that accrue from engagement at this level of involvement and influence.
In the sections that follow, results from each layer of the hierarchy will be
further analyzed and discussed.
7.1.4 ESOL Perspectives
For the ESOL perspectives, strategic is rated highest by both panels, followed by
economic, legal and organizational. The weight of the organizational perspective has
changed little between the two panels and is deemed to be an insignificant factor in the
decision to standardize technologies. Panel 2a rated the legal perspective 21% higher.
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This may be due to the less litigious environment in the ICT industry when USB was
being standardized in the early 1990s; in more recent times IP-related legal
entanglements have multiplied. Panel 2a rated the strategic perspective 11% lower. This
may be partly offsetting the increase in the importance of the legal aspects of
standardization, resulting in a relative tradeoff in priorities. There is negligible difference
in the relative weight placed on the economic perspective between the panels.
7.1.5 Economic Criteria
For the economic criteria, Market Expansion (ME) is consistently rated highest by
both panels. Indeed, the standardization of USB increased market opportunities for its
early proponents as shown by Gawer and Cusumano (2002). Opportunity Cost (OC) is
rated 30% higher by the experts on Panel 2b. R&D Savings (RD) is rated 33% higher in
importance by experts in Panel 2a over their peers in Panel 2b. Panel 2b experts rated IP
Revenues (IP) higher by 33%, emphasizing the opportunities in harvesting USB IP at its
introduction. Panel 2b judged Cost of Absence (CA) higher by about 24%. Panel 2a rated
Cost of Presence (CP) higher by about 33%, reflecting the growing costs in attending
SDOs. Panel 2a rated Tangible ROI (TR) 41% higher, reflecting expectations of economic
gains and recoupment of investments through technology standardization.
7.1.6 Strategic Criteria
For the strategic criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated higher than other
criteria by both panels. Panel 2b rated Trends/Disruptions (TD) higher by 19%,
confirming its importance at the time of USB adoption. Network Externality (NE) is rated
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higher by Panel 2a by 27%, reflecting the importance of ecosystems in standardization.
Experts on Panel 2a rated Intangible ROI/Leadership (IR) higher by about 13%,
suggesting that ICT firms expect to establish leadership in the ecosystem through
standardization. This finding was also observed by Gawer and Cusumano (2002).
7.1.7 Organizational Criteria
For the organizational criteria, Rules/Procedures (RP) & Organizational Efficiency
(OE) are rated highest by both panels consistently. There are negligible differences in
the panels’ ranking of Enrollment Policy (EP) of the SDO. Panel 2b rated Governance
(GO) and Funding (FU) higher by over 30%, reflecting the need for a smooth functioning
SDO. Panel 2a rated Certification Program (CP) higher by 30%, suggesting the growing
importance of product interoperability in the ecosystem. Panel 2b rated organizational
Focus (FO) higher by 14%, suggesting the importance of proper marketing to position
USB technology in the market. Panel 2a rated Partnerships (PA) higher by 50%, showing
a strong preference for SDO collaboration.
7.1.8 Legal Criteria
For the legal criteria, both panels rated IPR Licensing (IL) as the highest
consideration, followed by IP Disclosure (ID) and Antitrust (AN). This is in keeping with
expectations since a major component of technology standardization is the availability
of licenses to IP held by others in the ecosystem, the need for a priori disclosure of
essential IP and the SDO enforcement of its antitrust policies. Panel 2a rated
Incorporation (IN) higher by 28%. This suggest that in more recent times SDOs seek to
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take advantage of the benefits inherent in better organization, transparent/democratic
governance and more favorable tax treatments provided under the law (such as
501(c)(6)). Panel 2b rated Government Regulation (GR) higher by roughly 36%.
7.1.9 Composite Outcome Scores
For the global outcome scores, the highest decision alternative from the
preferences of both panels is O1 (Join & Drive Standard). Both panels rated O2 (Join &
Monitor Standard) as the next highest preference. Both panels exhibited consistency in
the choice of O3 (Join & Exclude IP) in that this alternative was the third-most preferred
outcome. O4 (Do Not Join) was the least favorite outcome of both panels. Panel 3a
showed a nearly 18% higher preference for O1 while Panel 3b showed a nearly 12%
higher preference for the same outcome.

7.2

Key Decision Factors
As was observed, both panels rated the strategic perspective as the highest

consideration in this decision. Also, both rated Product Alignment (PA) as the highest
decision criterion, constituting nearly 8% and 10% of the total decision score in the
General and USB models, respectively.
The computed eigenvalues show that the top 5 criteria differ slightly between
the two panels. In the General model the other top factors in order of priority are IPR
Licensing (IL), Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD) and Intangible
ROI/Leadership (IR), while in the USB model the other top factors in order of priority are
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Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD), Cost of Absence (CA) and IPR Licensing
(IL). Further analysis of these findings will be discussed in the next chapter.

7.3

Model Sensitivity
Using the aforementioned “what-if” scenarios, extreme weights are assigned at

the perspective layer of the hierarchy to determine the sensitivity of the General and
USB models to such perturbations. Three different profiles are used as follows:
Profile 1: for each perspective in turn, assign a 70% weight while holding the
other perspectives at a uniformly low weight of 10%.
Profile 2: eliminate the organizational perspective and its criteria since they do
not appear to be significant, re-normalize the weights for the other perspectives and
repeat the method described in Profile 1 with weights of 80% and 10%, respectively.
Profile 3: eliminate the organizational perspective and its criteria since they do
not appear to be significant, re-normalize the weights for the other perspectives and
repeat the method described in Profile 1 with weights of 98% and 1%, respectively.
With the removal of the organizational perspective and the re-normalization of
the weights at the perspectives layer of the hierarchy and the criteria contributions to
the outcomes layer of the hierarchy, each of these “what-if” profiles was applied to
determine the model’s overall sensitivity to extreme perturbations. The results are
shown in Table 20.
The Baseline scores are the weights of the four outcomes when there are no
perturbations. The scores in the E, S, O, and L columns depict the change in outcome
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scores when each of the profiles is applied, with the higher weight being applied to the
identified perspective in that column.
Table 20 - Sensitivity scores for both models.
Profile

Model

Profile 1
70%

General

Profile 1
70%

Profile 2
80%

Profile 2
80%

Profile 3
98%

Profile 3
98%

Outcome
O1
O2
O3
O4

Baseline
38
25
23
14

E
36
24
24
16

S
42
27
21
10

O
39
22
23
16

L
31
23
25
21

USB

O1
O2
O3
O4

34
26
24
16

34
24
24
18

36
28
24
12

36
23
24
17

31
24
25
20

General

O1
O2
O3
O4

37
26
23
14

35
25
24
16

42
28
21
9

NA
NA
NA
NA

30
23
25
22

USB

O1
O2
O3
O4

34
26
24
16

33
24
25
18

35
29
24
12

NA
NA
NA
NA

30
25
24
21

General

O1
O2
O3
O4

37
26
23
14

34
25
25
16

45
28
20
7

NA
NA
NA
NA

28
22
25
25

USB

O1
O2
O3
O4

34
26
24
16

34
24
24
18

36
28
24
12

NA
NA
NA
NA

31
24
25
20

There are some changes in the weight distributions among the outcomes but in
all instances O1 leads the decision. The most perturbation is observed when the legal
perspective is arbitrarily weighted high as in Profile 3. When this is done, the composite
scores for the decision alternatives begin to level out as can be seen for the General
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model. A similar phenomenon is observed in the USB model, which was weakly
emergent when the organizational perspective was included in the model.
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Chapter 8:

Discussion of Findings

From the results documented in chapters 6 and 7 it can be seen that the overall
finding of this research points to the increasing importance of strategic decision-making
in determining whether or not to join a standards development activity. Both the
General model and the USB model substantiate this finding. In both cases, the economic
and legal perspectives lag behind the strategic perspective in importance.
The global scores of all criteria in the General model appear in Figure 18 below:

Figure 18 - Global criteria scores for the General model.
The global scores of all criteria in the USB model appear in Figure 19 below:

Figure 19 - Global criteria scores for the USB model.
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8.1

Key Findings
Both models confirm Product Alignment (PA) as the top criterion informing the

decision to participate in technology standardization. In the General model, this
criterion accounts for over 8% of the total decision score. In the USB model, this number
is even higher, accounting for over 10% of the total decision score. The experts believe
that aligning the firm’s corporate strategy and product roadmap to the emerging
standard is the highest consideration in the decision to join standards development.
IPR Licensing (IL), Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD) and Intangible
ROI/Leadership (IR) are ranked right behind Product Alignment in the General model,
whereas Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD), Cost of Absence (CA) and IPR
Licensing (IL) appear in that order in the USB model.
In the General model, three of the top five considerations are strategic, one is
legal and one is economic, whereas in the USB model, two of the top five considerations
are strategic, two are economic and one is legal, in that order. All the organizational
criteria are rated at the bottom of the pile for both models.
IPR Licensing (IL) is the second highest priority in the General model, whereas it
is the fifth highest priority in the USB model. Market Expansion (ME) is the third highest
priority in the General model, whereas it is the second highest priority in the USB model.
Trends/Disruptions (TD) is the fourth highest priority in the General model, whereas it is
the third highest priority in the USB model. Finally, Intangible ROI/Leadership (IR) is the
fifth highest priority in the General model but it does not make the top five in the USB
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model, whereas Cost of Absence (CA) is the fourth highest priority in the USB model but
it does not make the top five in the General model.
Both models agree in weighing the O1 (Join & Drive Standard) decision outcome
highest, although with variable weights amongst the two models. This finding favors the
active participation in, and contributions to, SDOs as confirmed by Gawer (2000).
In the USB model, the economic perspective shows a measurable distance
between it and legal considerations. This is a reflection of the fact that in the 1990s the
ICT industry was less litigious, and there were fewer “IP wars” then as opposed to now.
The model developed here has been shown to be robust and insensitive to
extreme perturbations in the data. Even with radical weight redistribution, the models
do not yield a different decision outcome, although the weight differences narrow in
some cases. Further, almost all disagreements within the panels are well below the
conventional threshold and all data from experts exhibiting inconsistency in their
judgment quantifications have been eliminated from the computation of eigenvalues.

8.2

Research Contributions
My research has enriched scholarship in technology management, specifically in

the area of standardization, in a number of ways as summarized in Table 21 below:
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Table 21 - Research contributions.
Contribution
Holistic ESOL framework and robust MCDA model that can be used by managers to
assess the key determinants of the decision to participate in technology
standardization (i.e. join SDO)
Taxonomy and insights on the variances between the IPR policies of different SDOs
in the ICT industry, and their influence on the diffusion and adoption of
technological innovations
Identification of the most and least important determinants in the decision to
standardize a technology, and verified by the application of the USB case as the
basis for comparison/contrast
Path-dependent “best practices” as a non-tautological strategy to minimize
resource allocation and maximize competitive advantage within the Transaction
Cost paradigm and related theories of the firm

Type
Praxis

Praxis

Praxis

Theory

8.2.1 Contributions to Praxis
First, the definition and application of the ESOL framework facilitates the
contextualization of technology standards within the economic, strategic, organizational
and legal perspectives. Such a multi-perspective structure, heretofore absent from
scholarship in this field, allows managers to adopt a more balanced and all-inclusive
approach in formulating the decision to join a given SDO, and to place emphasis where
it matters most for achieving the firm’s imperatives and objectives. Specifically, the
ESOL framework can be used to disaggregate and assess the chief factors that are
germane to the firm in its decision-making processes and structures with regard to the
standardization of innovative technologies. The significance of this contribution is
confirmed through feedback received from the experts who are directly involved in the
development of technology standards.
Next, my development of a robust, MCDA model to assist managers in ICT firms
in determining whether or not to participate in technology standards development fills a
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major gap identified in praxis and confirmed by experts in the field. My proposed model
identifies and ranks the most and least important determinants in the decision to
standardize a technology. The import of this contribution is corroborated through the
application of the USB case and borne out by the response of the experts to my findings.
Finally, to smooth the progress of the diffusion and adoption of technological
innovations through standards I have expatiated the implications of the varying
intellectual property rights management of SDOs. In deciding to participate in
technology standards development the firm may be obliged to offer license to its IP
portfolio that read on the standard to other members of the SDO. In effect, the firm
could coincidentally counteract some or all of the advantages derived from the exclusive
privilege of exercising the protected knowledge and methods inherent in its intellectual
assets such as patents. Knowledge about and transparency in IPR policy definition and
enforcement impacts the decision to join or to not join the SDO as has been shown.
8.2.2 Contributions to Theory
My research contributes to the extant Production Cost theory in considerable
ways. It is evident that the firm’s internal resources and assets, including IP, potentially
play a significant part in its prospects and motivations to participate in technology
standardization. It is equally evident that the firm’s long-term competitiveness and
growth prospects influence its decision to join a standards developing organization.
Consider the theory of Core Competence. It has been posited that core
capabilities constitute a “wellspring of new business development” when extended to
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adjacent market opportunities, and that they can positively impact a firm’s growth
potential by “exploiting economies of scope.”254 255 This viewpoint is buttressed by the
seminal works of many scholars, particularly those that have theoretical underpinnings
in the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm, and shed light on the firm’s distinctive
competencies and heterogeneous capabilities. 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 Proponents of RBV
argue that firms that possess valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources
are positioned for sustained competitiveness. The necessary conditions for such an
advantage include superior resources, ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource
mobility and ex ante limits to competition.263 However, within the classical economic
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, RBV is regarded as an evolutionary
economic concept with only limited applicability, especially given the inevitable
temporal changes in the routines and capabilities of the firm within a dynamic industry
or ecosystem.264 Moreover, as knowledge about the value of assets and their
combinational significance is broadly disseminated, those assets, over time, tend to
migrate to firms that value them most.265
With the exception of “strategic needs and social opportunities” in the formation
of industry-wide alliances, the body of research cited above is largely silent on
managerial strategies, in particular where it may be germane to the standardization of
innovative technologies.266 My research highlights the importance of path-dependent
“best practices” as a non-tautological strategy that can deliver advantage to the firm for
long-term competitiveness through participation in the development of technology
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standards within the ICT industry. This allows the firm to optimize its resources and its
investments. Whether other strategies are necessary or sufficient to inform the firm’s
decision is indeterminate and remains fertile ground for future scholarly endeavor.
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Chapter 9:

Limitations and Future Research

There are a few limitations that can be overcome in future scholarship. There are
also a number of interesting by-products of this treatise that deserve further probing
and study.

9.1

Limitations
First, the application of the USB case entails biases in the memory of experts and

historical learning. Consider that the USB technology was first conceived in the early
1990s. This limitation was overcome to some extent through comparison and contrast
with the General model.
Second, the proposed General model has been developed and quantified with
panelists with expertise in interconnect technology development within the ICT
industry. Although this segment of technological innovation is crucial in the
development of a number of indispensable products and has been the intense focus of
standardization for many decades, yet the panel experts can be viewed as sequestered
from other areas of non-ICT standardization efforts. While this is a minor limitation, yet
it can be overcome through the inclusion of experts in the fields of expertise in the ICT
industry, as well as other technical disciplines. The upside of this limitation is that the
panelists are fully affiliated with the goals of this study.
Third, the model has been quantified with experts that are mostly focused in de
facto standards development. Again, this is not a significant limitation since it aligns
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with the stated purpose and focus of this study. This limitation too can be overcome by
incorporating data from experts in de jure standards development.
Fourth, the use of pairwise comparisons, if not carefully analyzed, can be prone
to a known problem referred to in scholarly research circles as the violation of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives, through which a random removal of
alternatives in the comparison matrix and subsequent re-computation may result in an
illogical outcome, such as a previously low rated item trumping a higher one.267
Finally, the use of judgment quantification is representative of the personal
worldviews of the participating experts. This limitation was partially overcome through
mitigation of the Inconsistency and Disagreement scores.

9.2

Future Research
With respect to a research agenda for future scholarship, the exploration of

additional perspectives, decision criteria and decision outcomes to augment the
framework and the proposed General model developed in this treatise constitutes
fertile ground and could be a worthwhile pursuit for extending or customizing this
decision framework to a broader array of applications.
Next, the extension, application and analysis of the General model developed in
this research to other innovations in the ICT industry or to other fields, such as service
industries, could prove insightful and beneficial to future scholars in the field of
technology management.
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An interesting byproduct of this research highlights the need to probe into
uniform IP valuation methodologies which have thus far eluded professionals in the
field. IP valuation is important for setting licensing fees, determining transaction
support, vetting of merger and acquisition targets, forming of strategic alliances,
quantifying damages for infringement law suits, complying with accounting and
regulatory requirements, ascertaining attorney malpractice awards, shaping
intercompany transactions, defining collateral-based financing limits and many other
applications.268 An increasing body of recent research points to a deficiency in IP
valuation methodology. This deficiency is systemic and is based on experiential
knowledge that vastly inconsistent results are obtained from some of the prevalent
methods in use today.269 He identifies several methods in order of sophistication: cost,
market, income, discounted cash flow, risk, and so on, and admits that none of these
methods is universally applicable owing to several limitations, one of which is the lack of
a suitable technique for estimating the variables used in the valuation methods.
In the ICT industry firms decide to form consortia or alliances that have direct
bearing on their IP portfolios. Proper valuation of IP contributions form the basis on
which these alliances can come together and function for the benefit of the industry.
Damage analysis for lawsuits involving the infringement of IP is convoluted and does not
always resolve to a fee-simple amount. In such cases, uniform IP valuation provides
clarity, removes uncertainty and facilitates the equitable application of the law. In most
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accounting and regulatory environments, precise valuations are needed for entry into
balance sheets and other financial statements.
Further, Initial Public Offering (IPO) documents usually highlight the importance
of the IP held by the firm but the absence of a credible valuation methodology can
introduce risk and uncertainty in these IPO transactions. Moreover, in cases where
attorneys fail to obtain IP rights for their clients, valuations are necessary to determine
any losses for post facto recoupment. In most markets, various regulatory and tax
authorities require precise valuation of IP to determine whether the transfer of IP
among related parties must be further scrutinized for antitrust or other violations.
Finally, in certain situations IP can be a dominant asset when it is used as collateral to
obtain financing by a firm. Proper valuation is crucial in ensuring a successful outcome
for the firm. Aside from aiding in all of the aforementioned commercial and legal areas,
my research contributions will fill a void in the current academic literature by integrating
a decision support framework with an empirically-developed IP valuation model.
The development and application of a robust quantitative model for the
objective valuation of patents and other intangible intellectual assets would be
welcomed by most ICT firms. Ancillary research in IP portfolio valuation may touch on a
number of related topics such as optimal licensing terms to balance innovation with IP
investment recoupment, the relationship between the innovation strategies of the firm
and the IPR policies of standards development organizations, and so on.
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Investigating these and related issues constitute a formidable agenda to extend
scholarship in technology standardization.
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Appendix A: Data Collection Instruments
Instrument I.1

Subject Recruitment Letter

Dear [participant]

[date]

I am Ramin Neshati, a Ph.D. candidate in the Engineering and Technology Management
department of the Maseeh College of Engineering and Computer Science at Portland
State University. My dissertation is titled “Participation in Technology Standards
Development: A Decision Model for the Information and Communications Technology
Industry.” My proposed research is significant in that it will yield a decision-support
framework to guide technology managers in determining whether or not to join in
technology standards development.
If you volunteer to provide data for this proposed research, you will be asked to review,
sign and return the attached Informed Consent Letter which describes mutual
expectations for confidentiality and privacy. Please note that there are no risks to you
should you choose to participate, and your identity and responses will be held in strict
confidence. You may withdraw at any time without cause, compulsion or repercussion.
Participation involves returning the attached survey instrument. There may be
additional surveys to refine the various elements of the decision-support model.
Your participation will help in the development and validation of a decision-support
framework. The significance of this proposed research is potentially enormous as it
bears on Intellectual Property (IP) portfolios and licensing obligations of firms that
operate in the Information and Communications Technology industry. Your input will
enrich the knowledge base and impact the practice of technology standardization for
years to come.
You may reach me at rn@pdx.edu for any matter pertaining to this proposed research.
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati

Attachments: 1-Informed Consent Letter, 2-Model Development Instrument.
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Instrument I.2

Informed Consent Letter

Dear [participant]

[date]

Thank you for agreeing to participate in my proposed dissertation research titled
“Participation in Technology Standards Development: A Decision Model for the
Information and Communications Technology Industry.” The outcome of this proposed
research will be a decision framework to assist technology managers in the ICT industry,
such as you, to decide whether or not to standardize technological innovations.
Please be aware that you are not being asked, nor are you required, to disclose any
information that is confidential or sensitive to your firm or person. You will be asked to
indicate your preference on a set of decision criteria by providing quantified judgments
in a pairwise matrix of choices pertaining to technology standardization. All information
you provide will be maintained in strict confidence and your identity will not be
disclosed without your permission. You may withdraw from this research at any time
without cause and will not be subjected to any negative repercussions or loss of
confidentiality.
Should you have any questions about your participation in this proposed research,
please feel free to contact the Portland State University Human Subjects Research
Review Committee, Office of Research Strategic Partnerships, 1600 SW Fourth Ave.,
Suite 620, Portland, OR 97201, 503-725-3423. As always, you may contact me at
rn@pdx.edu for any technical questions related to the proposed research.
Please sign, date and return this note to indicate your understanding and agreement to
participate in this proposed research. You may e-mail it to rn@pdx.edu.
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
________________________________________________________________________
Name (optional)
________________________________________________________________________
Signature (required)
________________________________________________________________________
Date (required)
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Instrument I.3

Model Development Instrument
Phase 1 – Model Development Instrument

The extant academic literature on technology management highlights four distinct
perspectives which managers consider when making decisions on technology
standardization. These perspectives are: Economic, Strategic, Organizational and Legal
(ESOL). Are there other perspectives that should be considered in this context? If so,
please indicate:___________________________________________________________
Using a total of 100 points, please express your judgment about the relative importance
of the following paired items (e.g. Economic – Strategic). If the first item is 3 times more
important than the second, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the
latter. Do not assign 0 points at any time. If you judge that one item has no importance
in comparison to its pair, assign 1 and 99, respectively. Please rate the following pairs:
Compare
Economic
Economic
Economic
Strategic
Strategic
Organizational

Preference

Compare
Strategic
Organizational
Legal
Organizational
Legal
Legal

The Economic perspective is comprised of the following factors: cost of participation in
technology standardization, and return on investment in technology standardization.
Are there other factors that should be considered? If so, please
indicate:_________________________________________________________________
The Strategic perspective is comprised of the following factors: alignment to corporate
objectives, scope of the standards effort, network externalities (i.e. ecosystem support),
and appropriability (i.e. ease of adoption). Are there other factors that should be
considered? If so, please
indicate:_________________________________________________________________
The Organizational perspective is comprised of the following factors: membership
enrollment policy of the standards defining body (i.e. open, by-invitation, etc.), and
geographic range of the membership (i.e. global, confined to a region, etc.). Are there
other factors that should be considered? If so, please
indicate:_________________________________________________________________
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The Legal perspective is comprised of the following factors: IPR policy, and IP disclosure
requirement. Are there other factors that should be considered? If so, please
indicate:_________________________________________________________________
Thank you for participating in this phase of data collection. The decision-support model I
am developing is based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). I will follow-up on the
updated decision model using your (and other) data and will be asking for further
judgment quantifications on the revised model definition at each level of the decision
hierarchy.
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
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Instrument I.4

Model Validation Instrument

Dear [participant]

[date]

Thank you for participating in this important research effort; your input has been most
useful. The attached data collection instrument pertains to Phase 2 of my dissertation
research: model validation. The instructions are embedded in the attached instrument. I
appreciate your time and attention.
Please print, complete, scan & e-mail your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before
10/19/12!
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
Attachments: 1-Model Validation Instrument.

Phase 2 – Model Validation Instrument (estimated completion time: 15 minutes)
Thank you for participating in Phase 1 of this research effort. Your input, and those of
others, has been incorporated into my model. Based on recent academic literature and
your inputs, I have revised the preliminary AHP model on technology standardization in
the ICT industry as shown below. Elements in solid (yellow) boxes are from the original
model, elements in dashed boxes are additions from your inputs.
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In Phase 2 you are asked to validate the revised model via a series of simple checklists. If
you concur with the presence of the element, mark the “Agree” column for that entry; if
you oppose the presence of the element, mark the “Disagree” column for that entry.
Note: I am NOT asking for your input on the computed weights, only the model
elements.
Please print, complete, scan & e-mail your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before
10/19/12!
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Please express your [dis]agreement on the model’s Perspectives in the checklist below:
Perspectives

Agree

Disagree

Economic
Strategic
Organizational
Legal
Environmental/Societal
Please express your [dis]agreement on the Economic criteria in the checklist below:
Economic Criteria
Market Expansion (growth of TAM)
Opportunity Cost (other use of resources)
R&D Savings (savings through learning w/ min invest.)
IP Revenue (income from licensing)
TTM Incentive (fast product intro)
Cost – Absence (loss from non-participation)
Cost – Presence (expenses for participation, giveaways)
Tangible ROI (investment recoupment)
Intangible ROI (leadership, etc.)

Agree

Disagree

Please express your [dis]agreement on the Strategic criteria in the checklist below:
Strategic Criteria
Enabling Rivals (rivals gain at no cost)
Grow Expertise (build tech/market savvy)
Develop Adjacency (new skills/tech/…)
Alternative Technologies (invent around)
Trend/Disruption (avoid surprise)
Technology Scope (delimit scope for predictability)
Appropriability (ease of adoption)
Network Externality (ecosystem support)
Product Alignment (BU alignment with market)
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Agree

Disagree

Please express your [dis]agreement on the Organizational criteria in the checklist below:
Organizational Criteria
Governance (BoD, officers, elections, committees, etc.)
Funding (income, expenses, grants, etc.)
Certification Program (logo, compliance testing, etc.)
Rules/Procedures (operating structure)
Efficiency (responsive to market needs)
Technology/Market Focus (develop-only, promote, …)
Member Contribution (ease of participation)
Partnerships (collaborations, liaisons, …)
Enrollment Policy (member recruitment, geo reach, …)
Membership Depth (limited, complete, …)

Agree

Disagree

Please express your [dis]agreement on the Legal criteria in the checklist below:
Legal Criteria
Incorporation (legal status of the SDO)
Tax (tax treatment of the SDO)
Antitrust (policies of the SDO)
IP Disclosure (disclosure rules/requirements)
IPR Licensing (model used by the SDO)

Agree

Disagree

Please express your [dis]agreement on the Environmental criteria in the checklist below:
Environmental Criteria
Government Regulation (e.g. “green,” social, …)
Technology Diffusion (policies, barriers, etc.)

Agree

Disagree

Thank you for participating in the model validation phase of my research. I will follow-up
with the revised, validated model using your (and others’) input and will ask for
additional pairwise judgment quantifications at the criteria and sub-criteria levels of the
hierarchy.
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
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Instrument I.5

Model Quantification Instrument - Criteria

Dear [participant]

[date]

Thank you for participating in this important research effort; I have incorporated your
input, as well as those of other participants, in the validated decision model. In this the
3rd phase of data collection, I am looking for your quantified judgment on the
importance of various criteria in the decision model when compared in a pairwise
manner. The instructions are embedded in the attached document.
Please complete and send your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 11/16/2012!
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
Attachments: 1-Criteria Judgment Quantification Instrument.
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Phase 3 – Model Quantification Instrument (estimated completion time: 30 min)
Thank you for participating in my research on technology standardization in the ICT
industry. Based on your input I have refined the decision model as shown below:

Some elements that existed in the prior model were removed on the strength of the
preferential inconsistency among respondents. Specifically, elements with less than
2/3rd collective agreement of the respondents were dropped from further
consideration.
In Phase 3, you are asked to quantitatively rate the decision criteria. Using a total of 100
points, please express your judgment about the relative importance of the paired items
in the following four tables. For example, if the first item is 3 times more important than
its pair, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the latter. Do not assign 0 at
any time. If you judge that one item has no importance in comparison to its pair, assign
1 and 99 points, respectively. I have included a glossary at the end of this document for
your reference. Please e-mail the completed questionnaire to rn@pdx.edu. Should it
facilitate your response, I can send the Word version of this document upon request.
Thank you.
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Please rate the following Economic criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row.
Economic Criteria
Market Expansion
Market Expansion
Market Expansion
Market Expansion
Market Expansion
Market Expansion
Opportunity Cost
Opportunity Cost
Opportunity Cost
Opportunity Cost
Opportunity Cost
R&D Savings
R&D Savings
R&D Savings
R&D Savings
IP Revenue
IP Revenue
IP Revenue
Cost of Absence
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence

Preference Score
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Economic Criteria
Opportunity Cost
R&D Savings
IP Revenue
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI/Recoupment
R&D Savings
IP Revenue
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI/Recoupment
IP Revenue
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI/Recoupment
Cost of Absence
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI/Recoupment
Cost of Presence
Tangible ROI/Recoupment
Tangible ROI/Recoupment

Please rate the following Strategic criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row.
Strategic Criteria
Grow Expertise
Grow Expertise
Grow Expertise
Grow Expertise
Grow Expertise
Grow Expertise
Trends/Disruptions
Trends/Disruptions
Trends/Disruptions
Trends/Disruptions
Trends/Disruptions
Appropriability
Appropriability
Appropriability
Appropriability
Network Externality
Network Externality
Network Externality
Product Alignment
Product Alignment
Intangible ROI/Leadership

Preference Score
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Strategic Criteria
Trends/Disruptions
Appropriability
Network Externality
Product Alignment
Intangible ROI/Leadership
Technology Diffusion
Appropriability
Network Externality
Product Alignment
Intangible ROI/Leadership
Technology Diffusion
Network Externality
Product Alignment
Intangible ROI/Leadership
Technology Diffusion
Product Alignment
Intangible ROI/Leadership
Technology Diffusion
Intangible ROI/Leadership
Technology Diffusion
Technology Diffusion

Please rate the following Organizational criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row.
Organizational Criteria
Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance
Funding
Funding
Funding
Funding
Funding
Funding
Funding
Certification Program
Certification Program
Certification Program
Certification Program
Certification Program
Certification Program
Rules/Procedures
Rules/Procedures
Rules/Procedures
Rules/Procedures
Rules/Procedures
Organizational Efficiency
Organizational Efficiency
Organizational Efficiency
Organizational Efficiency
Focus (Tech/Market)
Focus (Tech/Market)
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Member Contributions
Partnerships

Preference Score
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Organizational Criteria
Funding
Certification Program
Rules/Procedures
Organizational Efficiency
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Certification Program
Rules/Procedures
Organizational Efficiency
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Rules/Procedures
Organizational Efficiency
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Organizational Efficiency
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Focus (Tech/Market)
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Member Contributions
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Partnerships
Enrollment Policies
Enrollment Policies

Please rate the following Legal criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row.
Legal Criteria
Incorporation
Incorporation
Incorporation
Incorporation
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust Policy
IP Disclosure Requirement
IP Disclosure Requirement
IPR Licensing Model

Preference Score
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Legal Criteria
Antitrust Policy
IP Disclosure Requirement
IPR Licensing Model
Government Regulation
IP Disclosure Requirement
IPR Licensing Model
Government Regulation
IPR Licensing Model
Government Regulation
Government Regulation

Instrument I.6

Model Quantification Instrument - Outcomes

Dear [participant]

[date]

Thank you for participating in this important research effort. In this the 4 th and last
phase of data collection, I am looking for your quantified judgment on the importance of
various decision alternatives when compared in a pairwise manner against the criteria.
The instructions are embedded in the attached document.
Please complete and send your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 5/31/2013!
Sincerely,
Ramin Neshati
Attachments: 1-Alternatives Judgment Quantification Instrument.
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Phase 4 – Model Quantification Instrument (estimated completion time: 30 min)
Thank you for participating in my research on technology standardization in the ICT
industry.
In Phase 4, you are asked to quantitatively rate the decision alternatives. Using a total of
100 points, please express your judgment about the relative importance of the paired
items in the following tables. For example, if the first item is 3 times more important
than its pair, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the latter. Do not assign
0 at any time. If you judge that one item has no importance in comparison to its pair,
assign 1 and 99 points, respectively. I have included a glossary at the end of this
document for your reference. Please e-mail the completed questionnaire to
rn@pdx.edu. Should it facilitate your response, I can send the Word version of this
document upon request. Thank you.
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ME
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

OC
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

CP
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

Economic Criteria
RD
O1
O2
O1
O3
O1
O4
O2
O3
O2
O4
O3
O4

TR
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4
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IR
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

CA
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

GE
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

TD
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

IR
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

Strategic Criteria
AP
O1
O2
O1
O3
O1
O4
O2
O3
O2
O4
O3
O4

DT
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

- 166 -

NE
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

PA
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

GO
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

Organizational Criteria
FU
CP
O1
O2
O1
O2
O1
O1
O3
O1
O3
O1
O1
O4
O1
O4
O1
O2
O3
O2
O3
O2
O2
O4
O2
O4
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O3

FO
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

MC
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

PA
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

OE
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

EP
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4
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RP

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

IN
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

AN
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

Legal Criteria
ID
O1
O2
O1
O3
O1
O4
O2
O3
O2
O4
O3
O4
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IL
O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

GR
O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

O1
O1
O1
O2
O2
O3

O2
O3
O4
O3
O4
O4

Appendix B: Expert Panel Data
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